Conceivable surprises: eleven possible turns in Russia's foreign policy by Fischer, Sabine et al.
www.ssoar.info
Conceivable surprises: eleven possible turns in
Russia's foreign policy
Fischer, Sabine (Ed.); Klein, Margarete (Ed.)
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerk / collection
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Fischer, S., & Klein, M. (Eds.). (2016). Conceivable surprises: eleven possible turns in Russia's foreign policy (SWP
Research Paper, 10/2016). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik
und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-48893-8
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Sabine Fischer and Margarete Klein (eds.) 
Conceivable Surprises 
Eleven Possible Turns in Russia’s Foreign Policy 
SWP Research Paper 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
German Institute for International  
and Security Affairs 
 
 
RP 10 
October 2016 
Berlin 
  
 
  
 
 
 
All rights reserved. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft  
und Politik, 2016 
SWP Research Papers are 
peer reviewed by senior 
researchers and the execu-
tive board of the Institute. 
They reflect the views of 
the author(s). 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft  
und Politik  
German Institute  
for International  
and Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Germany 
Phone  +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax  +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1863-1053 
Translation by Meredith Dale 
(Revised and updated 
English version of 
SWP-Studie 15/2016) 
  
 Table of Contents 
 5 Introduction: Conceivable Surprises in  
Russian Foreign Policy 
  Sabine Fischer and Margarete Klein 
 I. EU/Europe 
 13 Far-right Victory in Paris: 
The Kremlin and the French Elections 
  Liana Fix and Ronja Kempin 
 18 Russia Launches a Multifaceted Campaign 
to Discredit Germany 
  Susan Stewart 
 II. Other Regions 
 25 Russia Gives Serbia the Choice: 
Satellite or Bargaining Chip 
  Dušan Reljić 
 30 Breakthrough in the Kuril Islands Dispute 
between Japan and Russia 
  Alexandra Sakaki 
 35 Russia Replaces the United States as 
Iraq’s Security Partner 
  Azadeh Zamirirad 
III. Internet, Energy and Security 
 43 EurasiaNet – How They Split the Internet 
  Marcel Dickow 
 47 Russia Withdraws from  
Nuclear Arms Control 
  Oliver Meier 
 52 Gazprom Loses Its Export Monopoly 
  Kirsten Westphal 
IV. Eurasia 
 59 Confrontation in Russia’s Backyard: 
Intervention in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 
  Sebastian Schiek 
 64 “Republic of Ossetia-Alania”:  
North and South Ossetia Unify  
in the Russian Federation 
  Franziska Smolnik 
 72 Russia after the Duma Elections: 
Reformist Government and Nationalist 
Foreign Policy 
  Sabine Fischer and Margarete Klein 
  Appendix 
 77 Abbreviations 
 78 The Authors 
 
 
  
 
 
 SWP Berlin 
Conceivable Surprises 
October 2016 
 
 
5 
Introduction: Conceivable Surprises in 
Russian Foreign Policy 
Sabine Fischer and Margarete Klein 
Russia’s foreign policy has taken numerous unexpected turns since 2013. 
Developments such as the annexation of Crimea, the military intervention 
in Syria, the crisis in relations with Turkey and the instrumentalisation of 
obscure incidents such as the “Lisa F. case” to discredit the German govern-
ment all took most Western experts and decision-makers by surprise. Mos-
cow appears to be using unpredictability tactically to take the initiative 
vis-à-vis other actors. In the process, the Kremlin is deliberately taking risks 
with potentially unforeseeable consequences for European and inter-
national security. The lack of transparency in decision-making processes 
and the absence of open public debate also make Russia’s foreign policy 
actions difficult to assess. Moreover, with decision making processes in 
Russia highly centralised and monopolised, the Kremlin is in a position to 
act rapidly and does not need to consult with international partners or 
take account of democratic procedures and domestic political reservations. 
That does not mean, however, that there is no room for Germany and 
Europe to be better prepared. This study identifies conceivable surprises in 
Russian foreign policy that should expand our thinking about the activi-
ties of the political leadership in Moscow. 
About the Project 
In retrospect it is clear that the events in Ukraine and Syria did not simply 
appear out of nowhere. In fact, they were the product of developments 
unfolding over a longer period but largely missed by experts and political 
actors in Germany and the EU – as well as in Russia. That blindness is to a 
great extent caused by the lack of transparency of political processes in 
Russia. Other significant reasons are to be found on the Western side, how-
ever. Over the past years, expertise on Eastern Europe has been systemati-
cally reduced throughout the EU, to a point where it is impossible to ad-
equately monitor political processes in Russia and the post-Soviet space. 
Moreover, broader political developments play a role in determining 
which issues absorb the attention of experts and political decision-makers. 
Between the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 and the annexation of 
Crimea in March 2014 other major events such as the EU’s financial and 
institutional crisis and the Arab Spring largely overshadowed Eastern 
Europe. By the time growing tensions were noticed it was already too late. 
Germany and the EU have also been misled by illusions and misconcep-
tions. For example, the “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet space in the 
2000s were interpreted in simplistic democratic/undemocratic and pro- 
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Scientifically Based Foresight: 
Concept and Methodology 
Lars Brozus 
SWP understands scientifically based foresight as a method for analysing 
conceivable future events and developments in foreign policy and secu-
rity. These are not forecasts, because, obviously, the future is impossible 
to predict. In reality, it is rather unlikely that events and developments 
will unfold exactly as described here. What we can do, however, is 
point out scenarios that would be of great political relevance for Ger-
many and the EU if they were to occur. A forward-looking foreign 
policy should therefore already now be paying attention to them. 
The contributions share the scientific rigour of their argumentation. 
Because the future cannot be foreseen, statements in its regard are 
necessarily associated with great uncertainty. The method of scientifi-
cally based foresight serves to minimise this conceptual and methodo-
logical uncertainty. Rather than leaving them implicit, we explicitly 
reveal the assumptions and causalities that characterise each scenario. 
Such transparency is an essential precondition for exposing the inher-
ent assumptions to scrutiny and discussion. It represents, therefore, an 
important touchstone for distinguishing diligent foresight from specu-
lative guesswork. 
Transparency is also essential for another reason. The foresight situa-
tions described in the following represent a contribution to illuminat-
ing the “universe of possibilities” for political action.a It is thereby un-
avoidable that they also play a part in forming that universe, because 
the authors are selecting from all the conceivable factors, variables, 
trends and influences. They concentrate on those that are pertinent to 
their analysis and neglect others. 
Thus readers are confronted with a, as it were, prestructured image 
of the future that influences their perspective on future events. It is all 
the more important, therefore, to apply an academically reflected ap-
proach when constructing the situations so as to preserve transparency 
concerning the choice of factors taken into consideration and the 
reasons for that choice. 
The scholarly quality of the contributions is secured by a rigorous 
multi-stage selection and review process. First of all, short concept 
papers addressing “Conceivable surprises in Russian foreign policy”  
were gathered from researchers across the institute. These had to cover 
three questions: 1. What could happen? 2. Why could it happen? 3. What 
a  “[C]urrent and future political choices can (and must) be made from a wide universe 
of possibilities and not from an overdetermined past that permits only one inevitable 
divisive response.” Philip E. Tetlock and Geoffrey Parker, “Counterfactual Thought Ex-
periments: Why We Can’t Live without Them & How We Must Learn to Live with Them”, 
in Unmaking the West: “What If” Scenarios that Rewrite World History, ed. Philip E. Tetlock, 
Richard Ned Lebow and Geoffrey Parker (Ann Arbor, 2006), 14–44 (27). 
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Scientifically Based Foresight (cont.) 
 
this mean for Germany and the European Union? The outlines were dis-
cussed in two workshops, one of which involved external participants. 
The three central criteria for assessment were: 1. consistency, 2. plausi-
bility, 3. originality and relevance. The likelihood of a scenario actually 
occurring played no role in the assessment process. 
After the workshop the drafts were revised and passed through two 
rounds of peer review and feedback, first by the volume editors, then by 
the institute leadership. The outcome of that exhaustive process is the 
contributions you find gathered in this volume. 
 
Western/pro-Russian terms. The resulting policy was unable to respond in 
adequate detail to problems arising in the region’s various states. Its self-
perception as a transformative force for peace made the EU (and with it 
Germany) blind to the growing geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe. 
Last but not least, internal disagreements within the EU also hampered the 
development of a consistent and proactive policy towards Russia. 
In this study we examine eleven situations that could occur in different 
regions and policy areas during the coming years. We do not, however, 
claim to predict the future or to forecast particular events. Instead, the 
authors apply their expertise to reveal and extrapolate existing trends. The 
point is not to think up situations, but to think through existing structures 
and developments. What we are interested in here – as in the SWP Fore-
sight Studies – is a “grey swan”, in the sense of “a crisis that develops over 
a longer period in the absence of adequate political prioritisation”.1 As 
such, the outlined situations possess a certain level of likelihood, but with-
out it being possible to say whether they will actually occur, and if they do 
so, whether this will be in the form described. There is no need for the in-
vestigated scenarios to be consistent with one another, as they merely 
represent “possible futures”. 
Fields and Topics 
EU/Europe: Both contributions in this section anticipate Moscow continuing 
to exert influence on the politics and societies of individual EU member 
states. Liana Fix and Ronja Kempin outline a situation revolving around 
Russian support for the Front National in the French presidential and par-
liamentary elections in 2017. In the scenario described by Susan Stewart, 
Moscow deploys a combination of defamation and subversion to discredit 
the German government and bring about changes in Germany’s policy 
towards Russia. The authors of both contributions note massive threats to 
 
1  Lars Brozus, ed., Unexpected, Unforeseen, Unplanned: Scenarios of International Foreign and 
Security Policy: Foresight Contributions 2015, SWP Research Paper 1/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016), 5. 
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the EU’s cohesion and argue that Moscow has a strong interest in weaken-
ing the Union. Both contributions identify possible openings for Russian 
influence, arising above all through structural weaknesses in the respec-
tive political, economic and social systems. These need to be addressed if 
European states and societies are to protect themselves against such inter-
ference. 
Other regions: Dušan Reljić sees the Kremlin threatening to abandon its 
UN Security Council veto on recognition of Kosovo if Serbia continues 
seeking closer relations with the European Union. In Alexandra Sakaki’s 
contribution Russia and Japan resolve their dispute over the southern 
Kuril Islands and sign a peace treaty. Azadeh Zamirirad pictures Russia 
signing a security agreement with Iraq, thereby establishing a corridor of 
influence extending from Syria to Iran. In all three contributions Moscow 
finds itself confronted with foreign policy challenges. While the cases of 
Serbia and Japan are principally about securing scope and influence, 
Azadeh Zamirirad portrays Russia exploiting a window of opportunity to 
expand its position in the Middle East. From the Western perspective the 
possible consequences are not automatically negative and destabilising; 
they may in fact offer options for cooperation. 
Internet, energy and security: Marcel Dickow describes a development 
where Russia and China isolate themselves from the global internet and 
establish their own “EurasiaNet”. Oliver Meier imagines Moscow threaten-
ing to withdraw from the INF Treaty and station intermediate-range mis-
siles in Europe in response to NATO’s missile defence plans. In Kirsten 
Westphal’s contribution Gazprom loses its export monopoly, thus liberalis-
ing the transit routes for Russian gas exports – as the EU has long de-
manded – but also allowing Russian exporters to expand their market 
share in Europe. Russia sees the three issues addressed here primarily 
through the security lens. While this leads Moscow to respond confronta-
tively in the situations described by Marcel Dickow and Oliver Meier, eco-
nomic rationality could conceivably win the day in Kirsten Westphal’s ener-
gy scenario. For the West, that could create opportunities for cooperation. 
Eurasia: Sebastian Schiek describes Russian military intervention in 
internal conflicts in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan encountering considerable 
resistance. In Franziska Smolnik’s contribution relations between Russia 
and Georgia take another turn for the worse, leading Moscow to permit 
South Ossetia to found the “Republic of Ossetia-Alania” and join the Rus-
sian Federation. In both cases Russia’s motivation is to prevent loss of in-
fluence in the post-Soviet space. This leads Moscow to takes great risks, and 
to find events in Central Asia spiralling out of its control. Sabine Fischer 
and Margarete Klein bring together the strands of Russian domestic and 
foreign policy: Following Alexei Kudrin’s appointment as prime minister 
at the beginning of 2017 the EU receives increasingly ambivalent foreign 
policy messages from Moscow. Do these reflect a deliberate division of 
labour or a conflict within the elites? 
Introduction 
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Conclusions 
The contributions gathered in this volume reveal four factors that shape 
Russia’s foreign policy. They should be kept under observation in the inter-
ests of anticipating surprising turns that evade prediction. 
Interests and perceptions: The Kremlin formulates the “emergence of a new 
world order” “based on international law and principles of equality, 
mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs of states” as its 
highest priority.2 It positions Russia as an independent major power 
shaping both regional (Eurasian) and international relations. In the Rus-
sian discourse, “major power” is defined in terms of two criteria: Firstly, 
Russia must be capable of encountering the United States on equal terms 
and, in concert with like-minded actors, replacing the US-led unilateral 
world order with a multipolar one. In that interpretation, other Western 
actors such as NATO and the EU do not operate autonomously but are 
guided by American hegemony. Secondly, Russia claims the territory of the 
former Soviet Union as its sphere of influence, where it sets the rules and 
external actors play a subordinate role. Specific Russian interests in the dif-
ferent regions and policy fields unfold within this conceptual space. They 
must be closely watched for gradual or sudden change. 
Instruments: The instruments of Russian foreign policy have steadily 
developed and differentiated in recent years. Military capacities have been 
improved, and a multitude of “soft” tools added: orchestrated disinfor-
mation campaigns in traditional mass media and online social networks, 
instrumentalisation of ethnic minorities, exploitation of civil society orga-
nisations, economic cooperation and economic pressure. Regular stock-
taking of this set of instruments is required (to the extent permitted by the 
lack of transparency in the Russian political system) in order to arrive at a 
realistic estimation of Moscow’s capacities to act. Clarity over continuity 
and change in Russian interests and perceptions also permits conclusions 
to be drawn about whether and in what form Moscow is prepared to make 
use of its foreign policy instruments. 
Interdependencies: Empirical evidence of the past fifteen years suggests 
that Russia engages most energetically with states and regions where its 
relationship is one of close interdependency. The contributions in this 
study also point to this structural characteristic of Russian foreign policy. 
The more comprehensively a specific state or region is intertwined with 
Russia, the more closely change there will affect Russian interests. Inter-
dependency can work in both directions. It can increase prosperity and 
security – or produce vulnerabilities that other states may exploit. In this 
respect, Russian foreign policy evolves in concentric circles: the willing-
ness to interfere and take risks is greatest in the immediate neighbour-
hood and Europe, declining successively with growing geographical dis-
tance. 
 
2  Official Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Concept 
of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”, 12 February 2013, http://archive.mid. 
ru//brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D (accessed 15 February 2016). 
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Opportunities and constraints: Finally, whether or not Russia acts depends 
strongly on developments occurring in the affected countries, regions and 
policy areas themselves. In some situations the Kremlin may feel forced to 
respond where it considers its interests threatened, in others it may grasp 
emerging opportunities. Opportunities and constraints may arise in states 
and regions without Russia having actively created them. Western policy, 
too, can contribute to the emergence of such constellations. Therefore, 
Western policymakers must consider the extent to which their actions 
create opportunities and constraints for Moscow. 
It goes without saying that reflecting upon possible future events does 
not enable us to anticipate and prevent all conceivable surprises. Nonethe-
less, this kind of exercise is important in order to expand our analytical 
thinking about Russian foreign policy into the future. We need to be open 
in two ways: open to potentially negative developments that are currently 
difficult to detect, and open – despite persistently poor relations and 
mutual loss of trust – to situations that offer potential for cooperation. It 
must be assumed that surprises are most likely to occur in those policy 
fields and regions where Russian interests and interdependencies are 
strongest. In line with the aforementioned concentric circles, this concerns 
first of all the post-Soviet space, followed by the other European states and 
then other regions. 
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Far-right Victory in Paris: 
The Kremlin and the French Elections 
Liana Fix and Ronja Kempin 
In summer 2017 France’s newly elected president, succeeding the hapless 
Socialist François Hollande, forms an alliance with the far-right Front 
National (FN) and appoints its leader, Marine Le Pen, as prime minister. 
Hitherto, the country’s political class had relied on the French majority 
voting system to restrain the FN. This strategy worked for the December 
2015 regional elections: left-wing candidates with no prospect of success 
withdrew in the decisive second round in favour of conservatives and 
prevented a landslide victory by the FN. In 2016 the established parties, Les 
Républicains (LR) and Parti Socialiste (PS), act cautiously on issues like the 
refugee crisis to deny the FN opportunities to raise its public profile. How-
ever, preoccupied with internal power struggles, it takes both PS and LR 
until the end of 2016 to decide on their candidates for the April 2017 presi-
dential election. Meanwhile the FN, united behind Marine Le Pen, presents 
a solid election programme in October 2016. In addition, FN receives a €25 
million loan from the Moscow-based First Czech-Russian Bank, enabling it 
to conduct a nationwide campaign and steadily improve its popularity. 
Shortly before Christmas 2016 the French-language service of the Rus-
sian radio and internet outlet Sputnik publishes a documentary showing 
clandestine meetings between PS and FN representatives. In discussions, 
they agree to work together against the Républicains, who are leading in 
the polls, including arrangements on specific constituencies. While the FN 
manages to emerge from the scandal almost unaffected, it is the last straw 
for the fractious PS. In January 2017 the party’s left wing, led by Martine 
Aubry, splits off to establish a new election platform, France Gauche et 
Indépendante (FGI). Now both left-wing parties, FGI and Parti Socialiste, 
fall behind the FN in the polls. Marine Le Pen reaches the second round in 
the presidential election, but eventually loses to the conservative Alain 
Juppé. With the June 2017 parliamentary elections, the French left ulti-
mately fades into irrelevance. But the Républicains also feel the elector-
ate’s disenchantment with “established” politicians. Against all expecta-
tions, Front National becomes the strongest party in the French National 
Assembly. For newly elected President Juppé and the Républicains, an 
alliance with Le Pen is now the only option to form a government. 
Russian Interests and Instruments 
Russia has two primary interests in influencing the 2017 French elections. 
Firstly, to weaken the ability of the EU to decide and act in unanimity, 
which has proven surprisingly consistent and painful for Moscow in the 
case of sanctions. By supporting Eurosceptic actors and discourses in EU 
Liana Fix and Ronja Kempin 
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14 
member states, Russia is seeking to foster a “Europe of nations” and a new 
form of bilateralism with individual member states. France, as a founding 
member of the Union, plays a key role in this attempt. Secondly, Moscow is 
aiming to undermine transatlantic relations. The Kremlin has long ob-
jected to a world order it perceives as unipolar and US-dominated – reso-
nating with Gaullist forces in France keen to see their country’s former 
status as a major power restored. In pursuit of its goals, the Kremlin sup-
ports political forces in Europe – on both the left and the right – that share 
its agenda. Russia offers its sympathisers a “trans-ideological repertoire” of 
discourses.1 Nevertheless, relations are especially close with far-right and 
populist parties like FN, which support Russia’s anti-Western conservatism. 
Moscow can draw upon a broad range of instruments extending from 
financial aid and economic influence to political smear campaigns and the 
mobilisation of minorities.2 The necessary infrastructure was already 
being successively expanded before the Ukraine conflict. A network of 
loyal media outlets and Russophile think tanks and cultural institutions 
works to strengthen Moscow’s “soft power” abroad. In France, these 
include in particular Russia Today (television), Sputnik (radio and online), 
the Institut du Monde Multipolaire (founded in November 2014 by an FN 
politician) and the Institut de la Démocratie et de la Coopération. The 
targets of this policy of interference are the political and economic elites, 
but it also looks to shape French public opinion. Russian influence is 
especially effective where it can exploit existing political, economic as well 
as societal fractures and vulnerabilities. 
A Window of Opportunity 
Russia’s image in France is not good. French public opinion is much more 
critical than the German. A survey in 2015 found about 70 percent holding 
negative attitudes towards Russia; 85 percent mistrusted Vladimir Putin, 
who was described as dictatorial, arrogant and dangerous.3 Nevertheless, 
two factors could motivate Moscow to intervene covertly in the French 
 
1  Stefano Braghiroli and Andrey Makarychev, “Russia and Its Supporters in Europe: 
Trans-ideology à la Carte?”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, no. 2 (2016): 213–33. 
2  Russia is France’s fourth-largest export market (after EU/Switzerland, United States and 
China), above all for high-tech products. “Les relations avec la Russie: comment sortir de 
l’impasse?” Rapport d’information de M. Robert del Picchia, Mme Josette Durrieu et M. 
Gaëtan Gorce, fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des 
forces armées du Sénat, N° 21, 7 October 2015, 67, http://www.senat.fr/rap/r15-021/r15-
021.html (accessed 22 June 2016). 
In September 2011 a “Conseil de coordination du forum des Russes de France” was 
founded in Paris under the auspices of the Russian embassy, to represent the estimated 
300,000-strong Russian diaspora in France. Cécile Vaissié, Les réseaux du Kremlin en France 
(Paris, 2016), 86–98; Lorraine Millot, “Les trolls du Kremlin au service de la propagande”, 
Libération, 24 October 2014. 
3  Claire Demesmay, “Die Wahrheit hat immer zwei Seiten”: Frankreichs offenes Ohr für russische 
Propaganda, DGAPkompakt 16 (Berlin: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik [DGAP], 
November 2015), 2, https://dgap.org/de/article/getFullPDF/27315 (accessed 10 March 2016). 
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presidential and parliamentary elections. Firstly, there is a general mood 
for political change in France, where the economy has been stagnant for 
years. France was already regarded as the “sick man of Europe” before 
President Hollande declared a “state of economic emergency” in January 
2016. At that point, more persons were without work than when Hollande 
took office in May 2012. The high unemployment rate affects in particular 
the young: 25.9 percent of 15- to 24-year-olds were out of work in Decem-
ber 2015. The labour market reforms announced in March 2016 by Prime 
Minister Manuel Valls led to widespread protests not only among the 
population, but also within the Parti Socialiste. Heavyweights like former 
labour minister Martine Aubry object vocally to the course adopted by the 
president and his prime minister, whose popularity ratings are in free-fall 
despite their resolute response to the terrorist attacks of 13 November 
2015. Dissatisfaction with the present government plays into the hands of 
the FN, which succeeded in winning over traditional PS voters in the 
December 2015 regional elections. The FN received 24 percent of its votes 
from the under-25s; 43 percent were from workers. 
Secondly, France’s right-conservative camp sympathises openly with 
Moscow and is therefore of particular interest for Russia. Relations have 
intensified and professionalised since Marine Le Pen assumed the FN lead-
ership in 2011 and undertook several trips to Moscow. While criticising 
the EU sanctions, the FN regards the Crimea referendum as legitimate. In 
the European Parliament FN votes consistently against resolutions critical 
of Russia. Front National also makes no secret of the fact that its regional 
election campaign was funded through a €9 million loan from the First 
Czech-Russian Bank. The party has no credit status with French banks. 
Voices critical of Russia have also found themselves increasingly mar-
ginalised in Nicolas Sarkozy’s Républicains. A majority of the party par-
roted the Kremlin’s rhetoric by placing responsibility for the crisis over 
Ukraine on the United States. In April 2015 members of the Républicains 
and the FN met secretly with State Duma Chairman Sergey Naryshkin in 
the Russian embassy in Paris, although Naryshkin’s name had already 
been placed on the EU’s sanctions list.4 In summer 2015 leading LR mem-
bers sharply criticised the governing Socialists for cancelling the sale of 
two Mistral-class warships to Russia.5 
There is also ideological affinity behind these Moscow-friendly stances.6 
The leaders of both LR and FN call for a strong state to enforce law and 
order at home and defend national interests abroad. Ultimately, they 
regard the liberal policies of the EU and United States as a threat to these 
interests: Brussels and Washington are perceived as denying nation-states 
the possibility to keep or regain control over strategic aspects of their 
 
4  Matthieu Goar and Benoît Vitkine, “A l’UMP, la tentation de Moscou”, Le Monde, 
13 April 2015.  
5  “Pour la droite, la non-livraison des Mistral à la Russie est une ‘faute absolue’”, Le Monde, 
6 August 2015. 
6  Demesmay, “Die Wahrheit hat immer zwei Seiten” (see note 3); Sylvie Kauffmann, “Le monde 
vu du Front national”, Le Monde, 28 March 2015. 
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economies, such as energy and food supply. France’s conservatives have 
therefore always called for a multipolar world order as an alternative to 
US-dominated globalisation. Alongside the wish to return to a system of 
sovereign states and traditional power politics, another element connects 
the Front National and the Républicains with Moscow: their preference for 
cultural homogeneity. The idea that Europe has become “morally deca-
dent” is common on both sides. 
In sum, Russia needs to invest only limited resources – for instance dis-
information and smear campaigns via Russian online media and think 
tanks – to tip the political balance in France and influence the outcome of 
the 2017 elections. 
Options and Recommendations 
To prevent Franco-German relations and the European integration process 
from faltering, Germany must address the question of how to respond to 
Russia’s policy of interference in internal affairs, especially with an eye to 
the Bundestag elections in September 2017. The covert, non-governmental 
nature of Russian influence makes it difficult to identify the Russian lead-
ership as the mastermind behind these activities. Moreover, many activi-
ties, take place in a legal grey area (for instance, party funding from other 
EU countries is permitted in France). Seemingly easy solutions like “counter-
propaganda” or banning Russian media are therefore legally untenable 
and incompatible with European values. 
As a first European measure against Russian disinformation campaigns, 
the East StratCom Task Force was founded in September 2015 within the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) to observe and expose Russian 
media activities, in particular in Eastern Partnership countries. Nine ex-
perts develop communication strategies and campaigns on the EU’s activ-
ities in this region. The Task Force’s goals include specifically countering 
disinformation, creating a positive EU narrative and ad hoc reporting on 
relevant topics and developments in the Union.7 Given that Russian media 
activities are also expanding in western EU member states, the Task Force 
should be enlarged and its remit extended beyond monitoring: Designed 
as a warning mechanism, the unit can identify escalation levels and in-
form the affected EU member states of elevated risk, where necessary. 
In order to establish effective prevention against Russian interference 
and avoid a scenario of the kind described here, the top priority must be to 
develop strategies for resolving the societal and socio-economic problems 
within EU member states. In other words, system-critical forces need to be 
deprived of their breeding grounds and thus prevented from being instru-
mentalised by outside forces. Germany should therefore actively support 
France in its economic reforms efforts and actions to combat youth un-
employment. At the same time Paris and Berlin must push at the European 
 
7  European External Action Service, “Questions and Answers about the East StratCom 
Task Force”, http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2015/261115_stratcom-east_qanda_en.htm 
(accessed 6 June 2016). 
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level for a common integration and migration agenda. The destructive 
potential of Russian influence is vast, and the crisis-ridden EU could col-
lapse completely if one of its founding members were to turn away from 
the EU and pursue an openly anti-European policy. 
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Russia Launches a Multifaceted Campaign to 
Discredit Germany 
Susan Stewart 
Russia firmly expects the EU to completely lift its economic sanctions in 
January 2017. In the end, after long discussions, the member states decide 
to extend them, for which Russia principally blames Germany. Growing 
resistance to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project within the EU also leads 
Germany to show greater understanding for some of its opponents’ argu-
ments, which generates growing aggravation in the Kremlin. Russian 
media respond to the decision to uphold sanctions with a campaign 
against Germany that exceeds anything previously witnessed and is com-
plemented by measures carried out by other Russian actors. Germany is 
increasingly portrayed as an enemy. 
Refugees and Russian-Germans 
The central topics for Russian media include Germany’s supposed inability 
to deal with the refugee question. They broadcast footage of clashes be-
tween refugees and right-wing extremists, asserting that German fascism 
is not dead but rather making a comeback. With the Chancellor’s position 
uncertain in advance of the Bundestag elections, they argue, there is a 
definite possibility of fascist parties coming to power. This hitherto rather 
subliminal fascism is also, they say, the reason behind Germany’s support 
for Ukraine, where it is well known that a fascist junta holds the reins. The 
reporting is backed up by statements from Russian-Germans complaining 
that they feel unsafe and that the government does not care about their 
rights.1 
In the meantime the Unity party, founded in March 2013 and led by the 
Russian-German Dimitri Rempel, wins a number of seats in the state elec-
tions in Saarland (March 2017) and North Rhine-Westphalia (May 2017), as 
well as local council seats. It enjoys a growing presence in Russian-
language media and RT’s German-language service, and is actively prepar-
ing for the 2017 Bundestag elections. The party’s representatives are 
courted in Russia, where they make numerous visits to various parts of the 
country. In July the Russian-German Olympic Games are held in Crimea. 
Through the efforts of Unity, vigorously supported by Russia, the concerns 
of the Russian-Germans gain a greater hearing in German politics and 
society and are taken up with increasing vehemence by Russian politicians 
in their rhetoric and their discussions with German counterparts. Repre-
 
1  Russian-Germans (Russlanddeutsche) are former members of the ethnic German minority 
in the erstwhile Soviet Union, most of whom have emigrated to Germany since the 1980s. 
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sentatives of the Russian embassy and its consulates in Germany offer to 
make it easier for Russian-Germans to apply for Russian passports. 
War and Peace 
In March 2017 the Kremlin launches a “peace campaign”, asserting that 
“certain forces” clearly want a third world war. The United States and Ger-
many are singled out as warmongers: the United States because it is 
seeking global dominance, Germany because it started the Second World 
War and never truly abandoned its military ambitions. Berlin is more than 
willing to do Washington’s bidding, the Russians assert. The campaign cul-
minates in a “peace conference” in May 2017, held the day after the mili-
tary parade commemorating victory in the “Great Patriotic War”. The Rus-
sians gain the support of numerous German anti-fascist activists. A parallel 
event in Germany is held in Magdeburg, enjoying support from members 
of Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the state parliament. 
Numerous interviews with Second World War survivors in Russia recall 
the suffering caused by the Wehrmacht and describe their experiences in 
drastic terms. Several feature films released in the run-up to the anniver-
sary emphasise the horrors of the Nazi regime and its hatred of Russia 
(more correctly, of the then Soviet Union, although that aspect is down-
played). Hillary Clinton’s first visit to Germany as newly elected President 
of the United States also takes place in spring 2017. Russian politicians and 
media regard her warmth towards Chancellor Angela Merkel as evidence 
of an unholy alliance set on world war against Russia. They point out that 
Russia and Germany would be able to prevent such a scenario if Berlin 
dropped its categorical refusal to cooperate. Germany will therefore share 
blame for the outbreak of war, which Russian foreign policy and security 
elites believe to be increasingly inevitable. 
Trips and Parties 
In spring and summer 2017 a series of German businesspeople and politi-
cians visit Moscow, mostly as “tourists”. They are courted by the Russian 
leadership and meet with influential Russian politicians and business 
representatives. Some of these visitors spend time holidaying in luxury 
resorts in Crimea. For Vladimir Putin’s birthday in October a former senior 
German politician stages a party attended by numerous prominent Ger-
man guests. The star of the evening is a Russian-German pop singer, who 
performs for Putin in German and Russian. There are persistent rumours 
that the German host had been asked to organise the party by a high-
ranking Kremlin official in order to set the stage for closer cooperation 
with influential pro-Russian Germans in the new political situation after 
the Bundestag election. 
The German visitors to Crimea and Moscow include a number of mem-
bers of the AfD. A few weeks after their return, the AfD organises demon-
strations in Germany and Brussels, which are plainly closely coordinated 
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with Russia’s embassy in Berlin and its mission to the EU. The central issue 
of the protests is the political line taken by Germany and the European 
Union towards Russia. The demonstrators oppose EU sanctions and argue 
that Russians should be offered visa-free travel. Numerous Russian jour-
nalists accompany the events. 
In parallel to these developments, Moscow relaxes its retaliatory meas-
ures towards selected EU member states that have regularly argued for the 
sanctions to be lifted, including Austria, Greece, Hungary and Italy. This is 
intended to encourage other countries to oppose sanctions and thus 
weaken Germany’s position. Anticipating a collapse of the Schengen zone, 
which Russian rhetoric treats as almost inevitable, Russia offers these 
countries bilateral visa arrangements on the basis that it will be easier to 
do business without border-related formalities. 
Russia’s Goals and Motives 
In the short term Russia wants the EU sanctions lifted in order to improve 
its economic situation. It also hopes to demonstrate the EU’s division over 
the issue. In the longer term Moscow’s course is designed to weaken the EU 
as a whole in order to improve its chances of realising its economic and 
security agenda in Europe. Part of that agenda includes paving the way for 
investment and bringing about a geopolitical constellation where Russia’s 
influence in the post-Soviet space is recognised as legitimate. Moscow also 
wants to drive a wedge between the EU and the United States in order to 
reduce the radius of action of both and block joint efforts directed against 
it. In the past Germany had almost never been the target of such attempts 
to sow division. Instead Moscow treated Berlin as a friend, while regularly 
discrediting EU members that were formerly Soviet satellites or (in the 
case of the Baltic states) Soviet republics. Now Moscow is applying a similar 
tactic to Germany, not only because Berlin’s line on Russia has become 
more critical, but also because the Kremlin was surprised and disappointed 
by the turn and feels slighted. From the Russian perspective Germany’s 
actions are interpreted as a betrayal of the previous good relationship. 
Because Russian politicians tend to personalise international relations, 
Angela Merkel is held principally responsible for policies felt to be anti-
Russian. The tendency for personalisation and division, combined with a 
conviction that Berlin will not adopt long-term anti-Russian positions, 
leads to attempts to deepen existing fault lines within Germany – between 
political actors, between politics and business, and within society. The Rus-
sians hope that discrediting the Chancellor and strengthening pro-Russian 
forces in Germany will persuade Berlin to correct its present course 
towards Russia. Ultimately they hope to achieve a Russia policy at EU level 
that satisfies their interests. The Kremlin sees various entry points for im-
plementing this strategy, ranging from political parties of all colours to 
business representatives or Russian-German activists. 
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Strengthening Germany 
Various German political, economic and societal actors perceive certain ad-
vantages in permitting themselves to be instrumentalised for Russian pur-
poses. Parts of the population also exhibit a reflexive solidarity with Russia 
rooted more in extraneous factors such as personal socialisation than in 
actual developments. These tendencies can best be counteracted by tack-
ling existing socio-economic weaknesses within Germany and not hesitat-
ing to address and condemn problematic Russian actions and campaigns. 
The German government can close off one flank that Russian propaganda 
regularly exploits by dealing as effectively as possible with the large num-
bers of refugees. As well as promoting their integration, this also means 
engendering greater public understanding for those forced to flee their 
homes. Vigorous support for the economy must be maintained, because an 
economic deterioration would stoke feelings of insecurity in the popula-
tion. Such measures can also contribute to social consolidation and a mar-
ginalisation of the radical groups that are often susceptible to external 
influence and targeted by Russian actors. 
This approach will admittedly only yield results in the medium to long 
term, nor will it stop Russia continuing its tactics – possibly with some suc-
cess. Where Russian actors operate outside the legal framework this must 
be investigated and where necessary prosecuted. And false or abusive Rus-
sian assertions must elicit unequivocal refutations, even at the risk of 
increasing tensions. This will prevent the German government’s positions 
being misinterpreted, and force the Russians to clarify their statements. In 
the present situation an unpleasant dialogue is less dangerous than talk-
ing past one another – even if it hampers short-term cooperation. 
  
 
 
  
 
II.  Other Regions 
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Russia Gives Serbia the Choice: 
Satellite or Bargaining Chip 
Dušan Reljić 
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin did not mince his words when he re-
ceived Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić in the Kremlin on 26 May 
2016. After congratulating Vučić on his latest election victory, Putin 
expressed his hopes that there will be “a worthy place” in the new govern-
ment in Belgrade for those who “give serious attention to developing” 
Russian-Serbian relations.1 The Russian president is well aware that Vučić 
has long been seeking EU membership for Serbia and closer relations with 
NATO.2 Putin’s expression of “hope” was thus in fact an unmistakable 
demand for Belgrade to change course and heed the Kremlin’s wishes. Mos-
cow is warning that when its patience with Belgrade’s equivocation 
between east and west runs out, Serbia will have to choose whether it 
wants be Russia’s satellite – or its bargaining chip. 
Serbia – an Unreliable Ally in Moscow’s Eyes 
In autumn 2016 Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev is expected in 
Belgrade for a long-planned visit. But the trip may be postponed indefinitely, 
as Vučić has offended Russia. In February 2016 the Serbian prime minister 
signed an agreement with NATO regulating the diplomatic status of NATO 
personnel in Serbia and bringing the country financial benefits.3 Moscow 
would like a similar agreement with Belgrade, but Vučić shows no signs of 
complying. On the contrary, Serbian government circles suggest that such 
an agreement would not be productive for “Serbia’s European future” and 
the prime minister will not give in to “three years of persistent Russian 
pressure”.4 Almost at the same time in Moscow Russian Deputy Prime 
Minister Dmitri Rogozin bluntly told Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić 
that signing an agreement with Russia would be in the interests of Serbia’s 
valued military and political neutrality. 
 
1  Website of the Russian President, “Vladimir Putin vstretilsya s Predsedatelem Pravitel-
stva Respubliki Serbii Aleksandrom Vuchichem” [Vladimir Putin meets prime minister of 
Republic of Serbia], 26 May 2016, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52010 (accessed 
27 May 2016). 
2  Sergey Belous, “How Long Will Belgrade Seesaw between NATO and Russia?”, Voltaire Net-
work (Moscow), 23 April 2016, http://www.voltairenet.org/article191425.html (accessed 1 May 
2016). 
3  “Vučić – treba da se dičimo zbog sporazuma sa NATO-om” [Vučić: We should be proud 
of agreement with NATO], Sputnik, 19 February 2016, http://sptnkne.ws/aFbs (accessed 
1 April 2016). 
4  “Vučić neće potpisati sporazum sa Rusijom” [Vučić will not sign agreement with 
Russia], Danas (Belgrade), 1 April 2016. 
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The military agreement Moscow wants would currently be largely sym-
bolic, because Russian forces participate far more rarely in joint exercises 
in Serbia than NATO troops.5 The purpose of the request is to force Serbia 
to openly declare its preferences in the field of security and military policy. 
An agreement would also create a legal basis for a much larger Russian 
military presence if the Serbian government did make the change of 
course demanded by the Kremlin. 
If Belgrade continues to resist Russia’s demands the following develop-
ment is conceivable: Russia announces that its Security Council veto 
against UN membership for Kosovo is no longer absolute, but a matter of 
negotiation. Large parts of the Serbian population regard this as a disaster 
and the mood turns against the government. Many Serbs believe that the 
prime minister alone is to blame for the deterioration in relations with 
Russia. The public mood starts to turn against the government. Alongside 
fears that important exports will be lost, the main source of anger is that 
the prime minister’s duplicitous stance has made an enemy of the Kremlin 
and risks Serbia’s vital interest in Russian support over Kosovo. The roughly 
forty pro-Russian deputies in the (250-member) Serbian parliament threaten 
to take demands for a change in foreign policy onto the streets. In order to 
preserve his power, Vučić attempts to put himself at the head of the move-
ment but is instead toppled as prime minister and party leader. Fresh elec-
tions strengthen the pro-Russian group to a point where no new govern-
ment can be formed without them. This is the development the West 
always feared, and the reason why it supported an increasingly authori-
tarian Vučić as a supposed guarantor of stability. Once again unrest grips 
Serbia and the Western Balkans. Russia is now politically more important 
in South-Eastern Europe than at any time since the end of the Cold War. 
Kosovo for Crimea 
Even if Russia fails to turn Serbia into a satellite, it still has the option of 
using the country as a bargaining chip. Russia might “relinquish” Serbia to 
the West by withdrawing its veto against Kosovo joining the United 
Nations, if the West in return accepted the annexation of Crimea. While 
explicitly rejecting Kosovan secession, Russian officials have cited it as jus-
tification for similar moves in the post-Soviet space, especially in relation 
to Crimea.6 They accuse the West of double standards, of judging what is 
essentially the same issue – the unilateral separation of a piece of territory 
from a sovereign state – as appears opportune. In the same manner as later 
Crimea from Ukraine, Kosovo separated unilaterally from Serbia. This did 
not prevent the West from welcoming the separation and immediately 
recognising Kosovo as an independent state. This interpretation implies an 
 
5  According to Russian figures there were twenty-two Serbian military exercises with 
NATO in 2015, and two with Russia. Ibid. 
6  Igor Novaković, Crimea and Russia’s “New” Attitude towards Kosovo, ISAC Policy Perspective 
(Belgrade: International and Security Affairs Centre [ISAC], April 2014), http://www.isac-
fund.org/download/ISAC-POLICY-PERSPECTIVE-7e.pdf (accessed 1 May 2016). 
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unspoken offer of a swap, the suggestion that an arrangement could be 
found for Kosovo and Crimea (and Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Such ideas 
have been encouraged by a declining determination in Western capitals to 
pursue the dispute over Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. A number of 
EU and NATO members leave no doubt that they would prefer to return to 
business as usual, rather than pursue the confrontation. 
A Russian break with the Serbian prime minister could also be inter-
preted as taking the bull by the horns. The Kremlin is clear that Vučić likes 
to use Russia’s Security Council veto for his own ends, but has no intention 
of making Serbia into Moscow’s “bridgehead” in South-Eastern Europe.7 
Russia lost its ability to project military power to the Danube and Adria 
soon after the end of the Cold War, when NATO completed its chain of 
members from the Baltic to the Black Sea in 2004. Its efforts to prevent 
further NATO enlargement in South-Eastern Europe and at least draw 
Serbia into its sphere of influence turned out to be increasingly futile. The 
decisive point is that alongside its finished strategic displacement from 
South-Eastern Europe, the three central instruments of Russian influence 
in the region show ever less effectiveness, especially in Serbia.8 
Map 1 
NATO member states 1990 and 2009 
Russia’s Three Instruments of Influence in South-Eastern Europe 
“Soft power”, the oldest and most constant instrument of influence, was 
never actually sufficient to secure unrestricted loyalty. Although shared 
Slavic roots, the Orthodox Church and memories of historic alliances with 
 
7  Georg Mirsain, “Tsena serbskogo platsdarma” [The price of the Serbian bridgehead], 
Expert (Moscow), 14 March 2016. 
8  Dušan Reljić, Russlands Rückkehr auf den Westbalkan, SWP-Studie 17/2009 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2009), http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/ 
products/studien/2009_S17_rlc_ks.pdf. 
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Russia continue to play an important role in the construction of Serbian 
identity, the numerous ethnic minorities (Hungarians and Albanians for 
example) are unmoved by historic and religious ties between Serbs and 
Russians. On the contrary, exaggerated closeness to Russia generates 
ethnic tensions that Serbia can ill afford in light of its efforts to join the 
EU. Many Serbs also eye Russia sceptically as a major power whose actions 
– as demonstrated by several episodes in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies – have not always been compatible with Serbian desires. 
Moscow’s second instrument of influence – South-Eastern Europe’s 
dependency on Russian energy supplies and especially natural gas – has 
waned. In 2015 Russia abandoned the construction of the South Stream 
gas pipeline partly on account of the EU’s strict conditions, alongside high 
construction costs and uncertain price trends for fossil fuels. Like all the 
other states in the region, Serbia is a member of the EU’s Energy Commu-
nity and has agreed to adopt its acquis. This prevents Russia’s Gazprom 
from using South Stream to expand its predominance in South-Eastern 
Europe, which in some places amounts to a monopoly. 
Moscow’s third instrument of influence is the threat to use its Security 
Council veto if the West attempts to make Kosovo a member of the United 
Nations. This forms the only firm tie between Serbia and Russia – but only 
as long as Belgrade insists that Kosovo remains legally part of Serbia. Putin 
has always told the Serbian government that the Russians cannot be “more 
Serbian than the Serbs themselves”. The Kremlin fears that Belgrade will 
sooner or later agree to recognise Kosovo as a condition of joining the EU. 
Then this instrument of influence would become worthless. This is why 
Moscow feels compelled to clarify Serbia’s “geopolitical belonging”. 
“Shadow Membership” in the EU 
In order to create stability in the Western Balkans, the Western allies have 
invested considerable political and financial capital and committed mili-
tary resources since the early 1990s. One of the West’s central security ob-
jectives should therefore be to preserve the region’s stability and achieve-
ments. To that end, it would be crucial for all countries of the Western 
Balkans to join the EU. As long as political, legal and economic conditions 
there are not brought up to those of the rest of the continent, South-Eastern 
Europe will remain problematic. This applies especially to Serbia, which 
still stands in latent conflict with the West over the Kosovo question. 
In order to bolster support for EU accession in the Serbian population, 
Brussels should avoid rushing ahead and forcing Belgrade to choose 
between recognising Kosovo and joining the EU. In view of the crisis in the 
EU and the sluggish pace of economic development and reforms in the 
Western Balkans, Serbia’s accession is not imminent anyway. Moreover, 
five EU member states – Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – 
also reject recognition, fearing that it could encourage secessionist move-
ments within their own territories. As long as the EU is at odds over the 
Kosovo question and there is no basic treaty between Serbia and Kosovo, it 
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would be counterproductive for the EU to press Belgrade (or Priština) into 
making far-reaching decisions. Excessive Western pressure would also im-
prove Russia’s chances of being perceived as the sole ally of the Serbs. 
The latest opinion surveys in Serbia show about 70 percent support for 
an alliance with Russia. But the more differentiated question of the pre-
ferred “political and economic alliance” found 37.5 percent for neutrality, 
the same figure for Russia and 16.2 percent for the EU. At the same time, 
however, about 44 percent support their country joining the EU, while 42 
percent oppose this.9 Earlier surveys found approval levels of almost  
60 percent. Altogether this would suggest that public opinion is contradic-
tory and shifting. The approval figure shot up after each successful step in 
the EU accession process, such as the lifting of visa requirements in 2010, 
only to fall again when bad news came from Brussels – whether in con-
nection with the euro crisis, the flow of migrants through the Balkans, the 
difficulties in the EU-brokered talks between Belgrade and Priština, or 
most recently the Brexit referendum. The foreign policy leanings of the 
Serbs and other Western Balkan nations considering EU accession are 
plainly shaped more by political perceptions of current events than by sup-
posedly deep-seated preferences and animosities. 
If it wishes to promote a long-term Euro-Atlantic orientation in the 
region, the EU needs to move quickly and energetically. Above all, the eco-
nomic stagnation and grave financial imbalances in South-East-European 
states need to be counteracted. Serbia, the other post-Yugoslavian states 
and Albania should receive access to the European Structural Funds, be 
permitted to join the EU’s financial stability mechanisms, and thus enjoy a 
kind of “shadow membership” of the EU. The crucial aspect is to raise the 
standard of living in the Western Balkan states and open up perspectives, 
especially for the younger generations. That is the only way to preserve the 
attraction of the EU’s model of democracy in South-Eastern Europe and 
curtail the influence of other actors like Russia, Turkey and Islamic 
states.10 
 
 
 
9  Representative survey commissioned by NSPM website, Belgrade, 25 November – 3 De-
cember 2015, http://www.nspm.rs/istrazivanja-javnog-mnjenja/ludi-od-srece-ili-jos-jedna-
otuzna-jesen.html (accessed 2 April 2016). 
10  Dušan Reljić, “Does the EU Want to Bring Russia and Turkey into the Western Bal-
kans?”, Euractiv.com, 12 December 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/ 
opinion/does-the-eu-want-to-bring-russia-and-turkey-into-the-western-balkans/ (accessed 
1 April 2016). 
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Breakthrough in the Kuril Islands Dispute 
between Japan and Russia 
Alexandra Sakaki 
In April 2017 Japan and Russia announce that they have resolved their dis-
agreement over the Kuril Islands and signed a peace treaty. The break-
through surprises international observers, since bilateral talks over the ter-
ritorial conflict had failed repeatedly since the 1990s. Since their occupa-
tion by the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War, both sides 
had claimed the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai 
group (see Map 2, p. 31).1 Ultimately the personal intervention of Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin is 
decisive for the success of the months of intense talks. At their joint press 
conference the two leaders declare that it is in the fundamental interest of 
both countries to work together more closely on economic, security and 
cultural matters. It is time to look forward not back, they say. The two 
leaders state that they have agreed an acceptable compromise in the terri-
torial dispute and a detailed ten-year plan for bilateral cooperation. 
Abe and Putin summarise the cornerstones of the agreement as follows: 
Japan recognises Russia’s sovereignty over the largest island, Etorofu, 
which makes up more than half the contested territory, and in return 
receives sovereignty over the other three islands. Russia will administer 
the second-largest island, Kunashiri, for the next ninety-nine years, but 
agrees to successively reduce its military presence there. A joint ten-year 
plan promises massive Japanese investment and technological support for 
opening up and developing the Russian Far East and Siberia. On the Rus-
sian side joint projects will be coordinated and overseen by the Ministry 
for the Development of the Russian Far East founded in 2012. In the energy 
sector the two countries also agree on a deepening of cooperation, for 
example in developing new gas fields. Moreover, exchange in the security 
policy field is to be intensified, initially by resuming the 2+2 talks of the 
foreign and defence ministers.2 
Abe decisively rejects Japanese media criticisms that he has abandoned 
the G7 line on Russia adopted after the Ukraine crisis. The international 
community should recognise Russia’s constructive contribution, he says, 
and resume involving Moscow more closely in handling international 
 
 
1  For reasons of simplicity this contribution uses the Japanese names and treats the 
Habomai group as a single entity. The Russian names are Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan und 
Chabomai (see Map 2, p. 34). 
2  Japan and Russia initiated so-called 2+2 talks in November 2013, bringing together the 
foreign and defence ministers from both sides. They agreed closer cooperation on security 
policy and planned joint naval exercises against piracy and terrorism. Until then Japan 
had used the 2+2 format only with close allies like the United States and Australia. 
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Map 2 
Contested islands in the Kuril archipelago 
crises. Tokyo still expects Moscow to make constructive steps in imple-
menting the Minsk Protocols, he says. 
Interests and Motives 
When he took office in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe declared that a 
peace agreement with Russia and a resolution of the territorial dispute 
were priorities for his government. His visit to Moscow in April 2013 – the 
first by a Japanese prime minister in ten years – demonstrated his resolve. 
In early 2014 Abe attended the opening ceremony of the Sochi Winter 
Olympics, while the other G7 leaders stayed away in protest over the 
human rights situation in Russia. The date of the opening ceremony, 7 Feb-
ruary, gave the occasion special significance. This is Northern Territories 
Day in Japan, and Abe left for Russia immediately after taking part in the 
traditional rally calling for the islands’ return.3 Regular meetings between 
Abe and Putin cemented a close personal relationship (they address one an-
other by first name). After the meeting with Abe in Sochi, Putin said that a 
“good environment is being created for solving the toughest problem 
between Japan and Russia.”4 
 
3  James D. J. Brown, Japan, Russia and Their Territorial Dispute: The Northern Delusion (Abing-
don: Routledge, 2016), 94. 
4  “Abe-Putin Relationship of Trust Can Help Advance Territorial Talks”, Nikkei Asian Review 
(online), 19 February 2014, http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Perspectives/0213VPS2Abe 
Putin-relationship-of-trust-can-help-advance-territorial-talks (accessed 4 March 2016). 
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Despite the crisis over Ukraine, Abe did not abandon hope of a break-
through in the relationship with Moscow. By sharply condemning Russia’s 
actions while imposing only toothless sanctions, Japan signalised its un-
broken interest in good relations. In the scope of its G7 Presidency in 2016, 
Tokyo intends to mediate between Moscow and the West because, Abe said, 
an “appropriate dialogue” is of great importance.5 Abe’s meeting with 
Putin in Sochi on 6 May 2016 should also be seen as an expression of this 
intention. The Japanese prime minister’s visit was a snub to the United 
States, which had counselled against in light of Russia’s actions in Ukraine 
and Syria. While Abe stressed that his overtures to Moscow stood in the ser-
vice of the G7, in fact bilateral interests are likely the underlying motive. 
Japan’s Russia policy is defined more than ever by geopolitical considera-
tions. Tokyo wants to avoid economic and political isolation by the West 
pushing Moscow even closer to Beijing.6 A closer Russian relationship with 
China would weaken the forces in Asia that represent a counterweight to 
Beijing’s growing regional and international influence. Economic interests 
also mitigate closer cooperation with Russia. In the energy sector Japan 
hopes to reduce its dependency on imports from the crisis-wracked Middle 
East. And there might also be a personal reason for Abe’s engagement in 
Russia. His father, Shintaro Abe, worked to improve Japanese-Soviet rela-
tions when he served as foreign minister in the 1980s. A further rapproche-
ment between Tokyo and Moscow is said to have been his last wish when 
he died in 1991. Prime Minister Abe regards his good personal relationship 
with Putin as an ideal precondition for resolving the territorial dispute. 
A breakthrough in bilateral relations would also be in Russia’s interests. 
In view of the deteriorating climate with Europe, the United States and 
NATO, Moscow is on the lookout for partners to reduce its international 
isolation. An improved relationship with Japan would be an important 
symbolic success and crack open the unity of the G7. And if Japanese 
mediation were actually to materialise and succeed in reviving coopera-
tion between Russia and the West, Moscow would expand its foreign policy 
leeway. Better relations with Tokyo would also be advantageous for Putin’s 
Asia policy. While the Western sanctions imposed over Ukraine led Russia 
to turn to China, it still harbours great mistrust towards its rising neigh-
bour. Most of all Moscow wants to avoid one-sided dependency on Beijing, 
which would force it into a junior partner role. If Russia succeeded in 
more strongly diversifying its relations with Asia and expanding its scope 
of action, this would bring it closer to its objective of being perceived as a 
“Euro-Pacific power”. And with Japan’s help it could press ahead with the 
development of its own Far East and Siberia, which Putin has repeatedly 
 
5  Lionel Barber and Robin Harding, “Japan’s Abe Calls for Putin to Be Brought In from 
the Cold”, Financial Times, 17 January 2016, https://next.ft.com/content/988d04c2-bcd3-
11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf (accessed 28 June 2016). 
6  Russia’s turn to China is observed above all in the strategic spheres of military and 
energy cooperation; see Margarete Klein and Kirsten Westphal, Russlands Wende nach China, 
SWP-Aktuell 78/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2015). 
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declared a “national priority for the entire twenty-first century”.7 But there 
are also risks to a rapprochement with Tokyo. Beijing could feel affronted 
and respond by turning away from Moscow. To avoid this the Kremlin 
could work for even closer cooperation with China, in parallel to the Japa-
nese-Russian initiative. 
Compromises and Obstacles 
The official Russian and Japanese positions appear unbridgeable. Both 
sides claim all four islands. While it would be tactically unwise to begin 
negotiations with a minimum demand, both sides have signalised willing-
ness to compromise (on the Russian side President Putin, on the Japanese 
several senior figures including National Security Advisor Shotaro Yachi 
and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga). Tokyo and Moscow have very 
different ideas about solutions. At the end of the 1990s the Japanese gov-
ernment suggested that Russia recognise Japan’s sovereignty over the 
islands but continue to administer the two largest (Etorofu and Kunashiri). 
Taro Aso and Shotaro Yachi, two central members of the Abe government, 
proposed dividing the island territory into two. Under their plan Japan 
would receive sovereignty over the three smaller islands, Kunashiri, Shiko-
tan and Habomai, as well as 20 percent of Etorofu. Former prime minister 
Yoshiro Mori, who for a time served the Abe government as an unofficial 
mediator, sees better prospects for a compromise if Japan claims only the 
three smaller islands. 
In 2000, during his first term of office, Vladimir Putin was the first Rus-
sian president to confirm the validity of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declara-
tion of 1956, under which Moscow declared its readiness to return the 
islands of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan following the signing of a peace 
agreement. But these islands comprise only 7 percent of the contested 
territory. Shortly before his re-election as president in 2012, Putin gave a 
press interview that caused a stir in Japan. He was quoted as saying that 
what mattered in the island dispute was not winning but finding an 
“acceptable compromise”. He described the nature of a possible solution 
with the word “hikiwake”, a term from judo meaning “tie” or “draw”.8 In 
Japan this comment provoked discussion about whether Putin might agree 
to return more than just the two smaller islands. 
Even if Japan and Russia share interest in finding an agreement, there 
are still numerous obstacles to be overcome. In a situation where any com-
promise can easily be interpreted as submission, there is great domestic 
pressure on negotiators on both sides. Political will at the highest level is 
therefore a precondition for success. Additional limits are placed on Rus-
 
7  “Interview to TASS and Xinhua News Agencies”, Official Website of the President of Russia 
(online), 1 September 2015, http://en.special.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50207 
(accessed 3 April 2016). 
8  “Putin Proposes Starting Over in Negotiations over Northern Territories”, Asahi Shimbun 
(online), 2 March 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201203020054 
(accessed 15 February 2016). 
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sia’s willingness to compromise by the fact that territorial concessions in 
the east would be hard to explain in relation to its actions in Ukraine, 
especially where there are 17,000 Russians living on the islands. Although 
the Kurils are not central to Russian identity in the way Crimea is, Russian 
security policy accords great importance to the principle of “territorial 
integrity”. At the same time, foreign policy shifts and incoherencies are 
easier to sell domestically in an authoritarian regime like Russia, where 
the leadership can disseminate corresponding propaganda via the media. 
Regular visits to the islands by Russian government ministers in recent 
years suggest that positions in the island dispute may have hardened 
among the elites (Putin aside). But it is also possible that the Kremlin is 
playing a deliberate double game to pressure Japan into meeting its de-
mands. 
Implications for Germany and Europe 
The described scenario would be associated with chances and risks for Ger-
many and Europe. A resolution of the long-running territorial dispute 
between Japan and Russia would be fundamentally welcome and have 
positive effects on stability in East Asia. As well as resolving a territorial 
conflict with military escalation potential, it could also constrain Beijing 
by offering Moscow a way out of a “junior partnership”. Germany and the 
EU should therefore avoid statements suggesting that one or other side 
had conceded or acted out of a position of weakness, as that would 
strengthen domestic resistance and endanger the implementation of any 
agreement. In view of the numerous territorial conflicts in East Asia, 
which have worsened in recent years, Germany and the EU could also 
appeal to the states involved to seek diplomatic solutions with similar 
pragmatism. With respect to Russia, the point would be to harness and 
maintain the positive momentum in its foreign policy. Although Europe 
should not drop the demands of Minsk II, it could seek an objective dia-
logue and initiate cooperation in fields where shared interest exists. One 
first step could be to initiate a security dialogue on East Asia. 
The main risk of the scenario is that Moscow could be tempted to ex-
ploit Tokyo’s bilateral moves in order to divide the G7. But close exchange 
and good coordination with Western partners would enable Abe to nudge 
the Kremlin towards cooperation and revive dialogue with Moscow. 
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Russia Replaces the United States as 
Iraq’s Security Partner 
Azadeh Zamirirad 
When the United States withdrew its troops from Iraq at the end of 2011, 
it already lost influence on the ground. Now its security agreement with 
Baghdad is put into question. Dissatisfied with the lack of success of the 
US-led coalition in fighting the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), Iraqi politicians decide to quit their alliance with Washington 
in spring 2018. Baghdad cancels its security agreement with the United 
States and signs a bilateral security declaration with Russia instead, which 
promises the Iraqi government logistical support and military equipment 
for fighting ISIS and recapturing lost territory. The new agreement entails 
Russian arms supplies, counter-terrorism training for Iraqi security forces, 
joint military exercises and access to Iraqi military airbases that can de 
facto serve as Russian airfields when needed. The agreement does not, how-
ever, contain a Russian-Iraqi defence pact in case of an attack. This new co-
operation bolsters Russia’s military presence on Iraqi soil, allowing Mos-
cow to use its enhanced leeway to establish a geopolitical corridor extend-
ing from Syria to Iran. 
Russian Opportunity 
Washington’s retreat from Iraq offers Russia opportunities in more than 
one regard. Here, as opposed to the Ukraine, Moscow can take over stra-
tegic space previously held by the United States at relatively low political 
cost. Its role as Baghdad’s new security partner allows Russia to expand its 
footprint in the Middle East, while Washington’s leverage diminishes even 
further. Moreover, replacing the United States as the global power fighting 
ISIS on Iraqi soil boosts Russia’s self-portrayal as the leading force in 
counter-terrorism. A military presence in Syria and Iraq – both of which 
have significant Kurdish populations – gives Russia crucial political lever-
age over Turkey whenever relations are strained. Closer military-techno-
logical cooperation, in turn, enables Moscow to generate much-needed 
additional revenues in times of international sanctions. Against this back-
ground and with regard to the unresolved crisis over the Ukraine, Mos-
cow’s growing role in the Middle East can also create leverage for negotia-
tions. Russia’s enhanced engagement in Iraq indicates to the international 
community that Russia has become a relevant security actor in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) and that its September 2015 intervention in 
Syria need not be an exception. Ultimately, this means that in a crisis-
stricken region of extraordinary geostrategic significance Russia can no 
longer be bypassed. 
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Map 3 
Iraq 
A New Alliance in the MENA Region 
In September 2015, Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria took a first step towars 
closer cooperation by proclaiming a security agreement that included 
intelligence-sharing. When Iraq cancels its security agreement with the 
United States in 2018, a political quasi-alliance of the four states emerges, 
mainly revolving around Russian-Iranian cooperation. Moscow’s growing 
role has tangible consequences for this bilateral relationship. While Iran 
welcomes the demise of US influence in the region, increasing Russian 
engagement on the foreign policy front comes at Tehran’s expense. After 
already losing political ground through Moscow’s military intervention in 
Syria, Tehran’s position is further weakened by the Russian presence in 
Iraq. Iran now faces a Russian capability to establish military bases right at 
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its own borders. At the same time, Moscow relies on Tehran coordinating 
military efforts on the ground in Syria and refraining from making use of 
its own political and military influence in Iraq to contradict Russian inter-
ests in the region. As long as the Syrian conflict continues, the new Rus-
sian-Iranian cooperation prevails. 
Other regional powers look on this cooperation with great concern. 
Recognising the ambivalent relationship and diverging geopolitical inter-
ests between Russia and Iran, they increase pressure on Russia rhetorically, 
all the while seeking concessions. Moscow addresses Egyptian and Saudi 
concerns first and foremost by supplying nuclear technology and conven-
tional arms. The number of contracts for Russian nuclear power plants 
rises and Russia’s rate of arms exports to the region increases. Moscow ben-
efits from Washington’s restrictions on military exports to the MENA 
region and its decreased willingness to export advanced technological sys-
tems for the security sector. 
Moscow’s relations with Israel and Turkey are shaped under different 
conditions. Russia wishes to avoid putting its bilateral relationship with 
Israel at risk by entering a strategic partnership with Iran, and retains its 
multi-track approach in the region. This includes close coordination with 
the Israeli security apparatus, also in Syrian airspace. While Israel officially 
adopts a critical stance towards Russian-Iranian cooperation, it counts on 
Russia to utilise its closer cooperation with Iran and rising influence in the 
region to prevent any escalation on the Israeli-Lebanese border. 
Moscow’s enhanced leeway is problematic for Ankara, in particular. A 
strong Russian presence in Iraq limits Turkey’s chances to intervene in 
Kurdish territory or politics and to establish credible deterrence at its 
border with Northern Iraq. However, the risk of a military escalation be-
tween Russia and Turkey remains low, despite their engagement in Syria. 
Moscow has no interest in triggering NATO’s mutual defence clause, while 
Ankara is aware that Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty does not apply 
if a military escalation is the result of a Turkish offensive. 
By seeking to build a sphere of influence extending from Syria to Iran, 
Russia risks being perceived as part of a pro-Shiite axis – especially by Tur-
key and the Gulf states – thus losing room for manoeuvre in the region. 
Russia could face political costs in the North Caucasus, where Turkey and 
the Gulf states have the political, ideological or financial leverage to fuel 
conflicts along Russia’s borders. 
Against this background, Moscow adheres to its approach of avoiding 
risking its relations with regional powers by entering into bilateral stra-
tegic commitments. Rather than looking for treaty-bound alliances with 
jointly defined and pursued interests, Russia seeks to establish loose tac-
tical coalitions that allow for security cooperations on an ad-hoc basis. 
Thus, Moscow refrains from mutual defence commitments. 
Azadeh Zamirirad 
SWP Berlin 
Conceivable Surprises 
October 2016 
 
 
38 
Implications for the United States and the European Union 
If political developments follow the scenario outlined above, in the 
medium term, other states in the region could turn to Russia as well. 
Egypt and Libya could be next to formally request Russian support for 
fighting ISIS. Whether Russia would be able to live up to the expectations 
with regard to counter-terrorism and be willing or able to provide corre-
sponding capacities is doubtful, however, considering its record to date in 
Syria. A security agreement with Iraq would not aim at substantially 
replacing the United States as a strategic partner in the region. Rather, 
such an agreement would follow Russia’s geopolitical calculation of ex-
panding its own radius of regional power projection. The challenge for 
Moscow lies in managing expectations while maintaining its omni-balanc-
ing approach in the region. Here, Russia is unlikely to abandon its policy 
of deliberate ambivalence in favour of explicitly defined regional alliances 
with tangible long-term goals. 
Further US retreat and growing Russian influence could transform the 
geopolitical order in the Middle East. Alliances that lasted for decades, 
such as those between the United States and Egypt or the Gulf states, would 
lose significance in light of new coalitions such as the Russian-Iranian. 
This would change the room for manoeuvre of both regional actors and ex-
ternal powers. Iraqi cancellation of the bilateral security agreement could 
meet with several responses by the United States. Washington could give 
up its own military presence on the ground altogether, try to make use of 
its remaining influence in Baghdad, or look for ways to coordinate its Iraq 
policy with Russia. The EU in turn would have to come to terms with the 
fact that Russia has become a central actor in the MENA region and will 
remain so for the forseeable future. Efforts to resolve numerous existing 
and potential future crises would thus depend on Russian participation. In 
a region where the European Union is directly affected by conflicts through 
the ensuing movements of refugees, this would increase Russia’s leverage. 
If the EU is to counteract the prospect of Moscow establishing and ex-
panding a political corridor of its own in the Middle East, it needs to 
address several issues in the long run, including narrowing down political 
spaces that Russia can easily occupy by mere proclamation. This entails, 
first and foremost, a credible political commitment to fighting the Islamic 
State based on a comprehensive European plan. After increasingly turning 
inwards in the course of the “refugee crisis”, there is a need for the EU to 
redirect its attention to the external sphere. Here, the EU can make use of 
the communication and cooperation channels with Iran that were estab-
lished through the nuclear agreement, in order to minimise Tehran’s 
incentives to pursue closer security relations with Moscow. This requires, 
firstly, earnest mediation in the strained Saudi-Iranian relations and, 
secondly, political support in establishing a regional security architecture 
that takes into account both Iran’s interests and those of the other re-
gional actors. In the long run, a regional security dialogue offers the best 
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chances for preventing bloc-building in the Middle East and limiting the 
military presence of external powers in the region. 
Lastly, entering a new phase of Russian-American and Russian-European 
rapprochement is crucial. Not only would it reduce the likelihood of 
Russia pursuing a containment policy towards the United States and the 
European Union in the Middle East, it would also diminish incentives for 
Moscow to invest politically and engage militarily in a region where other-
wise no vital Russian interests are at stake. 
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EurasiaNet – How They Split the Internet 
Marcel Dickow 
At the UN General Assembly in December 2018 President Putin officially 
announces the introduction of a “secure EurasiaNet” controlled by China, 
Russia and India. The EurasiaNet Oversight Board holds its first official 
meeting under Russian chairmanship in January 2019. The internet has 
been broken into two parts, with different technical and legal standards 
and correspondingly different political coordinates. The world wide web is 
now no longer global, the new EurasiaNet no longer open and free. The 
realm of global data is physically and logically fragmented. 
How does this occur? In summer 2017 a Russian blog publishes confiden-
tial documents from the Russian interior ministry describing previously 
unknown procedures for standardising IT network infrastructure. The 
documents also contain references to an existing intelligence cooperation 
with India and China. In August 2017 Russia announces its withdrawal 
from the Governmental Advisory Council (GAC) of the Internet Corpo-
ration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).1 Together with a num-
ber of Asian states, first and foremost China and India, Russia submits a 
motion to the Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU) to have the internet administered solely by 
states under the auspices of United Nations. This would be the death knell 
for the multi-stakeholder approach in internet governance, because non-
state and civil society actors (for example NGOs and academia) would no 
longer have a say. In the technical committees of the ITU China and Russia 
block development of protocols and standards and publicly reject the HTTP 
2.0 protocol drawn up by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which 
includes a proposal for mandatory encryption. 
Chinese foreign ministry documents published in January 2018 refer to 
a “EurasiaNet” and describe programmes for technical centralisation of the 
nationally controlled elements of the internet, and for further isolating 
them from the rest of the world wide web. One of the partners named in 
the highly confidential documents is Moscow. In the meantime Russia 
begins equipping the public network infrastructure of its enormous terri-
tory with Chinese hardware. A study in March 2018 finds that certain low-
bandwidth internet connections between Europe and Russia, China and 
India have been systematically truncated and replaced with a small num-
ber of central nodes. These accept only outdated (or non-standard) proto-
cols for secure connections. In certain parts of the world, especially in 
emerging economies, this leads to a renaissance of the insecure HTTP 1.0 
 
1  In particular the Russians cite what they regard as the “lack of internationalisation” of 
the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) observed after completion of the tran-
sition process (from US government oversight to sole responsibility of ICANN) in autumn 
2016. 
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protocol. In an interview in summer 2018, President Putin emphasises that 
Russia will close the technology gap with the West in cooperation with 
China, using its own standards and infrastructure. 
In particular regions increasing numbers of data packets are now modi-
fied in transit, for example by the addition of digital watermarks. And a 
split emerges in terms of transfer protocols. Parts of the Western infra-
structure become increasingly detached from the Eurasian, for want of a 
shared technical fallback in the transfer protocols.2 Data traffic becomes 
increasingly concentrated in a handful of easily monitored connections. 
Russian and Chinese Interests 
A EurasiaNet created through Russian-Chinese cooperation would be an 
instrument of internal power, through which the participating govern-
ments would be pursuing two objectives: to tighten control over their own 
civil societies and to ward off external influences. For governments that 
might be interested in establishing or participating in a EurasiaNet, the 
principal threat emanates from social and political reform movements 
(such as those that triggered the “colour revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine 
and so on). In the past such movements have mobilised using internet 
communication tools such as social media. There could also be economic 
incentives to establish a rival internet, including above all the prospect of 
breaking the US monopoly in the IT industry. But such a scenario can only 
be realistic for Russia if it is able to tap China’s technological and industri-
al capabilities. Both are striving for greater technological independence, 
especially from the United States, and both have grasped the opportunity 
to exploit the internet as a tool of surveillance and information control. 
They have succeeded in the latter above all because language barriers have 
largely prevented their own populations seeking information elsewhere. 
New technical standards endanger these arrangements, with develop-
ments such as transport and content encryption hindering state control 
and expanding the possibilities to anonymise communication. Russia’s in-
fluence on the development of these standards is small under the multi-
stakeholder approach to internet governance because Russian companies 
possess little market power. This is why Moscow has long been pressing for 
a multilateralisation of internet administration under the UN, in order to 
secure greater influence at least within its own territory. In parallel to 
these efforts, states like China and Russia manipulate or block particular 
communication protocols, such as Tor and VPN (Virtual Private Network) 
at the technical level. So in a context of continuously developing stand-
ards, both governments are interested above all in influencing the tech-
nical functions of the internet in a different sense – to restrict human 
rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of the press in digital 
space. The current leadership in Moscow could also possess ideological 
 
2  Russian and Chinese servers and nodes no longer accept current secure (“Western”) 
standards, while US and European servers and nodes reject older standards for reasons of 
security. 
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motives: a secure state-controlled network as its answer to the West’s open, 
global and supposedly insecure internet. 
Chinese firms have grown into earnest rivals for US network infrastruc-
ture suppliers, competing largely on price rather than innovation. Setting 
their own standards could boost their competitiveness – not in the West 
but certainly in Asia’s emerging economies and Africa. Russia would also 
profit enormously from technology transfer, which Beijing could then use 
as political leverage to pursue shared interests. And the rapid growth of a 
well-educated, English-speaking middle class increases Beijing’s incentives 
to further tighten its control over the flow of information and communi-
cation in the internet. This is how moves to secure technological sovereignty 
in the Chinese internet could lead to a policy of digital isolation. Yet Rus-
sian-Chinese cooperation over such efforts and a trend to digital disconnec-
tion would contradict China’s existing economic and export policies, 
which concentrate on global trade and value creation. 
Impacts on Germany and the EU 
The creation of a EurasiaNet would have economic and foreign policy 
repercussions for Germany and the European Union. European companies 
might find it almost impossible to establish secure connections with 
Chinese subsidiaries and partners. Instead they would find themselves 
forced to purchase additional network infrastructure from Chinese sup-
pliers in order to enable “secure” communication. It would also be conceiv-
able for contracts with Chinese companies to include clauses obliging 
European firms to purchase Chinese communication hardware. That 
would represent a paradigm shift in Chinese economic and export policy, 
towards a concept of technological sovereignty. But such business practices 
would trigger a Commission competition investigation. The EU member 
states with the closest economic links with China would certainly take a 
dim view of such practices, making it almost impossible to uphold a collec-
tive EU policy. 
A split in the internet would also cause massive foreign policy upheaval. 
A fight over the function of the internet and the rights of citizens in the 
digital world would very probably flare up between the states of the old 
West and certain African and Asian countries. While the United States – 
followed by European governments – would propagate the freedom and 
neutrality of the internet, African states would underline its importance 
for economic development. They might argue that the North’s ever-chang-
ing, costly (but secure) standards inhibit economic development in Africa 
and could be interpreted as a political tool to cement the North/South 
divide. For African countries, China’s arrival in the market would repre-
sent a partner just as capable as the “North” of developing the continent’s 
infrastructure. Here it is clear that the EU could counter such scenarios 
with a digital development strategy for Africa, offering African states 
digital partnerships if they continue to support the multi-stakeholder ap-
proach in internet governance. 
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It would not be impossible, given the underlying geostrategic and eco-
nomic interests, for the United States and Germany to end up disagreeing 
over how best to deal with the EurasiaNet states. The United States would 
vehemently oppose any watering down of internet standards, with Wa-
shington always backing its digital corporations, Silicon Valley and net-
work equipment suppliers and guarding their existing quasi-monopoly. 
Germany on the other hand could be tempted – also for economic reasons 
– to explore technical compromises (interfaces) above all with China. This 
would avoid a digital and economic rupture with China and at the same 
time open up new fields of cooperation with Russia. But such a move 
would represent a crass contradiction to Germany’s current cyber–foreign 
policy, which emphasises that the universality of human rights also 
applies in the digital world. 
Recommendations for Germany and the EU 
Today particular network standards and protocols form the basis for up-
holding political values such as network neutrality, freedom of access, 
openness and privacy. At the same time, the economic interests of the 
digital economy – like practically all traditional value creation these days – 
are closely tied to the functioning of the internet. The strengths of the 
internet lie in its “multi-stakeholderism” and in the infrastructure’s uni-
versality and net neutrality. These need to be protected. 
German and EU cyber–foreign policy should therefore rest on two pil-
lars. Firstly, it should stand firmly by the multi-stakeholder approach in 
internet governance and develop it in consensus with both partners and 
critical states. And secondly, the EU member states should pursue the goal 
of establishing their own technological capacities and using digital devel-
opment policy (cyber-capacity-building) to enable other countries – espe-
cially in Africa – to reduce or avoid one-sided dependencies. Here it would 
be fatal to treat economic policy and online human rights as antagonists. 
On the contrary, especially with respect to Moscow, the nexus between the 
economic potential of a free, open internet and the multi-stakeholder 
approach should be highlighted. Russia’s ailing traditional economy, its 
strong dependency on resource exports and the weak competitiveness of 
its industry should in fact create strong incentives to shift course to a 
globally-orientated digital economy. One guiding principle of German and 
European policy towards Russia should be to promote such a development 
and underline its dependency on a free and open internet. At the same 
Germany and the EU can demonstrate that organised cyber-criminality can 
be fought efficiently using the current standards, without requiring com-
plete surveillance and isolation of the internet. The credibility of German 
and EU cyber–foreign policy must not, however, be undermined by Wes-
tern intelligence services strategically eavesdropping the entire internet, 
and thus maintaining a practice of which their governments regularly 
accuse Russia and China. 
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Russia Withdraws from Nuclear Arms Control 
Oliver Meier 
After NATO announces that its missile defence system has achieved full 
operational capability, Russia responds by withdrawing from the Inter-
mediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). Moscow says the move is 
legally justified on the grounds that the missile defence system jeopardizes 
Russia’s “supreme interests”. Additionally, it says, the missile defence base 
in Romania which had become operational at the end of 2015 violates the 
INF Treaty because the United States could use it to launch nuclear-armed 
cruise missiles prohibited under the INF treaty. 
Citing Article XV, the Kremlin states that the withdrawal will take effect 
after six months.1 Russia threatens to deploy new intermediate-range 
weapons after that date. Initially, these would be nuclear-capable sea-
launched cruise missiles for the Baltic Fleet (permitted under the INF 
Treaty). At a later stage, Russia then also stations land-based cruise missiles 
(prohibited under the INF treaty) in Kaliningrad and Russia’s western dis-
tricts. NATO could avoid such an escalation, the Russians declare, by freez-
ing any further missile defence plans. Specifically, NATO’s second missile 
defence base in Poland planned for 2018 should not become operational. 
At the same time, Moscow offers NATO talks on “real cooperation between 
equal partners” on missile defence. 
Russia’s Stance on a Knife-edge 
Protagonists of strength-driven Russian policy regard arms control increas-
ingly critically. This applies especially to arms control agreements nego-
tiated and/or concluded towards the end of the Cold War. These critics cite 
a string of reasons why continued membership in agreements like the INF 
Treaty is disadvantageous to Russia. 
 Russia feels that NATO enlargement and the West-orientation of post-
Soviet states has destroyed the basis of key arms control agreements. 
Many of them date from an era when Moscow believed the West would 
treat it as a partner. The conflict with NATO has destroyed that assump-
tion, the Russians believe.2 
 
1  Article XV (2) of the INF Treaty reads: “Each Party shall, in exercising its national 
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary 
events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. 
It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to with-
drawal from this Treaty.” 
2  Moscow used a similar justification in 2007 when it suspended its implementation of 
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Wolfgang Zellner, “Stürzt der ‘Eck-
pfeiler der europäischen Sicherheit’ ein? Zur gegenwärtigen Krise des (angepassten) KSE-
Vertrags”, in OSZE-Jahrbuch 2007, ed. Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, 
Universität Hamburg (Baden-Baden: Nomos), 25–37. 
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 In conventional military terms Russia lags behind the West. Although it 
has greatly increased its defence budget, it still spends just a fraction of 
NATO’s total. Russia cannot catch up with the West’s military technology, 
especially not with regard to those weapons (missile defence, long-range 
conventional systems) that could target Russia’s nuclear weapons. No 
treaties cover these technologies. From Moscow’s perspective, nuclear 
arms control cements the status quo in precisely those areas where Rus-
sia could hold superiority. 
 Global power shifts amplify the feeling of inferiority. The military capac-
ities of the new powers emerging on Russia’s southern flank – India, 
Iran and Pakistan – are unrestricted by arms control agreements, while 
the United States faces no comparable threat in its direct neighbour-
hood. 
These factors have contributed to Russia’s decision to comprehensively 
modernise its nuclear arsenal. The programme’s roots go back years and 
lie in Vladimir Putin’s first term as president. Russia sees its nuclear pro-
gramme as a guarantee of independence, as a means to deter the West and 
as an instrument to influence discussions within NATO. Strategic nuclear 
weapons is the only area where a military balance between Russia and the 
United States exists. Russia has an advantage over NATO in tactical weapons. 
Whereas Washington wants to reduce the number of different types of 
warhead and delivery system, primarily to reduce costs, Moscow is devel-
oping and diversifying its arsenal. In the coming years, Moscow plans to 
introduce up to five different types of land-based strategic weapons. New 
delivery systems for strategic weapons as well as air- and sea-launched 
cruise missiles are designed to overcome the US and NATO missile defence 
systems.3 The 1987 INF Treaty restricts diversification by prohibiting the 
development of land-based intermediate-range weapons. 
Since summer 2014 the United States has been publicly accusing Russia 
of violating the INF Treaty by developing (or already producing) a new type 
of land-based cruise missile. Russia disputes this and has in turn accused 
the United States of violating the treaty. One Russian accusation is that the 
missile defence launch systems in Romania violate the treaty because they 
are also capable of launching cruise missiles. 
Domestically, the Kremlin can frame a withdrawal as a sign of strength 
and independence. In Moscow, the reciprocal accusations of treaty vio-
lations have strengthened the position of INF critics. Especially in the 
nuclear sector, the Kremlin has repeatedly sought to demonstrate that 
Russia is equal or superior to the United States (and NATO). Moscow can 
use Washington’s massive expansion of air-launched nuclear-capable 
cruise missiles (long-range stand-off weapon, LRSO) to justify “catching up” 
with new land-based systems.4 
 
3  Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016”, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 72, no. 3 (2016): 125–34. 
4  The United States intends to procure one thousand nuclear-capable cruise missiles 
(long-range standoff weapons). William J. Perry and Andy Weber, “Mr. President, Kill the 
New Cruise Missile”, Washington Post, 15 October 2015. 
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Concerns are sometimes expressed that Russia might withdraw from the 
New-START Treaty on strategic nuclear weapons. But in contrast to INF, 
this treaty dates from the Medvedev/Putin era. There is thus a degree of 
ownership by the present leadership. Moreover, its equal ceilings ensure 
parity with the United States. If Russia were to withdraw from New START, 
the United States would be free to tip the balance in its favour. 
Russia’s calculations with respect to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a resumption of nuclear testing are less obvious. 
While Russia ratified the treaty in 2000, the United States (and China) have 
yet to take that step. Moscow has always criticised Washington’s lack of 
political will to pursue ratification and complained that it leaves the two 
nuclear superpowers with unequal legal status. The obstacles to a Russian 
withdrawal would be smaller than for the INF Treaty because the CTBT has 
not yet entered into force. Such a move would be conceivable as a Russian 
response to a decision by the (new) US administration not to pursue CTBT 
ratification or to a withdrawal of Washington’s signature.5 
Implications and Options for Germany and NATO 
A Russian withdrawal from nuclear arms control would have grave con-
sequences for Germany and NATO. 
 A collapse of the INF Treaty could trigger a new nuclear arms race in 
Europe, and thus increase the risk of nuclear conflict. A further expan-
sion of the role of nuclear weapons in Europe would weaken the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other global non-pro-
liferation instruments. 
 A Russian withdrawal from the INF Treaty would trigger a new debate 
about a double-track decision in NATO and severely test alliance cohe-
sion. Congress has already requested the US Department of Defense to 
examine options for denying Russia any military advantage it might 
gain by violating the INF Treaty.6 
 The collapse of nuclear arms control would weaken an important chan-
nel of communication and cooperation with Russia. The prospects of 
new talks in this area would deteriorate dramatically. The German 
objective of initiating a confidence-building process on sub-strategic 
weapons would become less realistic. 
 If the nuclear arms control crisis worsened further, this could have im-
plications for cooperation with Russia on efforts to prevent the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction. Such cooperation is still produc-
tive. Thus, some in Washington could argue that the United States 
should restrict cooperation with Moscow in implementation of the Iran 
deal, in order not to “reward” non-compliance. 
 
5  The George W. Bush administration reviewed legal options to withdraw the US signa-
ture under the CTBT after it had taken office. Ultimately, the administration decided to 
not take such a step and left the ratification process with the US Senate. 
6  Kingston Reif, “U.S.: Russian INF Treaty Breach Persists”, Arms Control Today 46, no. 4 
(May 2016): 35. 
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By withdrawing from nuclear arms control Moscow is trying to strengthen 
its nuclear deterrent and to delink Europe from the United States. Russia 
would also like to weaken NATO’s cohesion by announcing the stationing 
of new nuclear weapons. The Alliance is looking at a new and controversial 
debate on how to respond to Moscow’s provocations. 
But attempts to split NATO could turn out to be counterproductive for 
Russia. The deployment of new weapons systems would create similar 
threat for all European NATO members. Currently, only the central Euro-
pean states lie within range of nuclear-capable tactical ballistic missiles 
like Tochka and Iskander. As soon as nuclear-capable intermediate-range 
weapons are located west of the Urals, the Western European states would 
be directly threatened, too. And by announcing the deployment of new 
land-based intermediate-range weapons, Russia would also admit to have 
worked for some time on prohibited systems. This could accelerate the loss 
of trust in Russian behaviour and thus strengthen NATO cohesion. 
Germany is not a party to the INF Treaty and can only influence the 
treaty members’ behaviour indirectly. But during the Cold War (and to 
some extent thereafter), Berlin has often successfully argued that nuclear 
arms control is an important instrument to reduce tensions. This line of 
thinking needs to be extended to the current political confrontation. In 
order to prevent any further Russian withdrawal from nuclear arms con-
trol, Germany should: 
 continue to stress the value of existing agreements and work towards 
greater nuclear transparency; 
 create a firewall between cooperation with Russia on non-proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and conflicts over other issues; 
 persuade Washington to identify openly and transparently the INF vio-
lations Russia is accused of, in order to increase the chances of construc-
tive resolution; 
 urge Washington and Moscow to resolve the dispute over violations of 
the INF Treaty at the level of experts and for such discussions to begin 
without preconditions; 
 work to reduce concerns about NATO’s missile defence through con-
fidence-building and transparency measures, including on-site visits at 
relevant locations; 
 work with Russia and the United States for discussions to be initiated at 
the expert level on the destabilising effect of cruise missiles, with a view 
to improving transparency, confidence-building and control of these 
weapons systems; 
 seek to reduce Russian mistrust over missile defence plans by offering 
confidence-building measures, for example to demonstrate that Aegis 
ashore installations are not capable of launching cruise missiles; 
 call for a debate about reforming and expanding the scope of the INF Trea-
ty, for example by updating contested definitions (armed unmanned sys-
tems, compatibility of missile defence systems, use of modules from 
intermediate- and long-range missiles for missile defence tests, trans-
parency in development of new types of cruise missiles). 
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A Russian decision to leave the INF Treaty would narrow Germany’s 
options. The direct threat to Western Europe from Russian land-based 
intermediate-range weapons and the open confrontation with Moscow 
would necessitate a resolute response by the Alliance. Here, it would be 
especially important to keep decisions about possible countermeasures 
within NATO.7 A Russian withdrawal from the INF Treaty would trigger a 
discussion about whether NATO should counter Russia’s new intermediate-
range weapons by increasing the role of nuclear weapons in its own 
defence and deterrence posture. As in the 1980s, such an arms race would 
be associated with exorbitant costs and great risks. Avoiding such an out-
come should be prioritised. 
 
 
7  At a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee at the end of 2015, Rose Gotte-
moeller, Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security, stated that possible 
responses to a Russian treaty violation “will be endorsed by our allies”. Rose E. Gotte-
moeller, Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security, “Statement for the 
Record”, Joint Hearing, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation, and Trade House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Stra-
tegic Forces, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C., 1 December 2015. 
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Gazprom Loses Its Export Monopoly 
Kirsten Westphal 
In 2017 Gazprom loses its monopoly on exports of Russian natural gas, 
opening the way for other operators like Rosneft and Novatek to export to 
the EU. This liberalisation of pipeline exports paves the way for the rapid 
construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline through the Baltic Sea. Objec-
tions to the project under the EU’s rules for the internal energy market are 
now moot, as third parties enjoy access at the coastal station in Russia. The 
twin lines come on stream in 2021. With feeders already in place and 
operated by legally independent companies, the EU can now import an 
additional 65 billion cubic metres annually through the Nord Stream sys-
tem. Russian exporters like Rosneft and Novatek successively capture mar-
ket niches in Europe. Market shares are there for the taking, as European 
gas fields in Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark 
rapidly deplete around 2020. Norway’s exports also shrink, because new 
fields in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea were too expensive to 
develop while prices were low between 2015 and 2020. Until 2025 Russian 
gas exporters principally take market share from European rivals, while 
Gazprom defends its strong market position through its low production 
costs and long-term contracts extending beyond 2025. When the global 
supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) contracts after 2025 Russian com-
panies push their total share of the European market far above 50 percent 
for a time. 
Conceivable: Orchestrated Liberalisation 
In view of the difficult market situation in 2016, characterised by moder-
ate oil prices, a falling rouble and sanctions, the Kremlin would have good 
grounds to selectively liberalise pipeline exports to Europe in order to 
maintain or increase its gas exports there. Liberalising exports, whether by 
pipeline or tanker (LNG), would be one plausible route to improve the rev-
enue side of the state budget. This would also secure the backing of the 
elite and help to keep contradictory interests in balance within the pro-
Putin economic elites. So-called independent gas producers (companies not 
owned by Gazprom) like Rosneft and Novatek have been lobbying for some 
time and with growing success for more competition in the Russian gas 
market. 
At the latest since 2009/2010 Gazprom, which emerged out of the Soviet-
era gas ministry, has been under pressure in most of Russia’s market seg-
ments. Far-reaching reforms affecting pricing, tariffs and access have been 
instituted in the Russian gas market. Gazprom’s market share has shrunk 
successively in the face of growing competition from other gas producers, 
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and by 2016 had fallen below 70 percent of total Russian gas production. 
The “independent” companies have captured one-third of the shrinking 
Russian gas market. 
In order to maintain or increase production levels and modernise their 
operations, Russian gas producers are competing increasingly fiercely for 
markets. So it is no surprise to find Rosneft and Novatek pressing for ex-
port options. Their first success was the liberalisation of LNG exports from 
1 December 2013, which in principle cracked Gazprom’s export monopoly 
in a small segment. The liberalisation has been very selective, and LNG 
exports remain the exclusive privilege of companies, individuals and 
projects belonging to elite networks, such as Rosneft and Novatek. Strategic 
considerations were also important for the Kremlin: the liberalisation of 
LNG exports was urgently necessary in order to market Russian gas world-
wide, but also to keep up with technological developments. This step also 
underlines the significance of the Arctic North-East (and North-West) Passage 
and Russia’s geoeconomic presence in the Arctic and the Pacific region. 
Since 2014 efforts to break Gazprom’s pipeline export monopoly (at 
least eastwards) have been tied to the construction of the Power of Siberia 
pipeline to China.1 At the end of July 2015 Rosneft presented a compre-
hensive proposal for a multi-stage reform,2 but this was dropped by the 
Russian presidential apparatus at the end of 2015. In spring 2016 Novatek 
launched another initiative aiming to weaken Gazprom’s gas monopoly.3 
Alongside these domestic developments, the planned common gas market 
in the Eurasian Economic Union also creates a need for liberalisation.4 It is 
unclear how quickly and deeply a common energy market will actually 
emerge in the course of the Eurasian integration process and what inter-
 
1  Four options were discussed: 1. Retain the status quo; 2. Gazprom to purchase gas from 
other producers under netback conditions (export price minus transport costs and export 
duties); 3. Establish a separate company or consortium to build and operate pipelines; 
4. Gazprom to build pipeline and charges for third-party access. Mikhail Serov, Margarita 
Papchenkova and Olga Churakova, “Minenergo ne nashlo dostupa v ‘Silu Sibiri’” [Energy 
Ministry finds no access to “Power of Siberia”], Vedomosti, 11 September 2014, http://www. 
vedomosti.ru/companies/news/33280291/minenergo-ne-nashlo-dostupa-v-silu-sibiri (accessed 
6 January 2015). 
2  The first phase was to begin in 2016 and permit other producers to export gas and LNG 
according to defined quotas. From 2019 the other producers were to receive a share of the 
export revenues (and an independent export company was to be founded). The plan was 
for exports to be completely liberalised by 2025, with Gazprom unbundled and an in-
dependent network operator established. Yuriy Barsukov, “‘Rosneft’ atakuet po vsem fron-
tam” [Rosneft attacks on all fronts], Kommersant, 23 July 2015, http://www.kommersant.ru/ 
doc/2773785 (accessed 15 September 2015). 
3  Novatek Gas & Power has a contract with the German firm Energie Baden-Württemberg 
AG to market gas produced by its subsidiary Arcticgas (owned by Novatek and Gazprom-
Neft). Under the export scheme Gazprom purchases gas from Arcticgas at netback condi-
tions and sells it on to Novatek Gas & Power. This way Novatek’s gas is piped to Europe. 
4  Maria Pastukhova and Kirsten Westphal, A Common Energy Market in the Eurasian Economic 
Union: Implications for the EU and Energy Relations with Russia, SWP Comments 9/2016 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2016). 
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nal reforms will be initiated in the process. This affects above all the mo-
nopoly on pipeline transport, but also export and import monopolies. 
Since mid-2015 there have been growing signs that – after the peak of 
the crisis over Ukraine – economic logic was again resuming precedence 
over geopolitics in Russian energy policy, with Gazprom testing new 
pricing strategies and auctions. It is becoming apparent that Gazprom 
intends to adapt to the rules of the third internal energy market package. 
Russia needs its European market. The Kremlin is apparently going along 
with this line in view of the difficult economic situation. 
Longstanding EU Concerns: 
Liberalisation, Reciprocity and Monopoly Power 
A liberalisation of Russian gas exports would achieve a longstanding EU 
objective. In the 1990s the transit of Central Asian gas through Russian pipe-
lines was a point of dispute in the Energy Charter process, because Gaz-
prom wanted to keep its monopoly on transport and export. Since the 
1990s the EU has pushed for liberalisation in the Russian gas sector, in the 
2000s propagated reciprocity in dismantling market barriers, and in 
recent years increasingly challenged the market power of the Russian gas 
monopoly. 
One important motivation for the EU to regulate its gas market lay in 
breaking Gazprom’s dominant market position as supplier to Eastern and 
East Central Europe, using monopoly and competition law as its decisive 
instrument.5 On the one hand, Gazprom historically possesses a dominant 
position in the Central and Eastern European markets. On the other, politi-
cal perceptions of gas supply questions have shifted in step with the EU’s 
eastern enlargement. The transit crises between Russia and Ukraine in 
2006 and 2009 highlighted how dependent the enlarged EU’s gas market 
was on Russian gas. 
The EU and Russia have increasingly been on collision course since the 
beginning of implementation of the third internal energy market package, 
which was adopted in 2009. While the EU seeks a stable and affordable 
supply at acceptable political cost, Russia wants to maximise resource 
rents and retain political control.6 The opposing interests are manifested 
in conflicts, for example over unbundling in the Baltic and above all over 
pipeline construction, operation and access. The European Commission is 
also pursuing an antitrust case against Gazprom. The liberalisation of gas 
exports to the EU would defuse the legal/regulatory conflicts and improve 
the chances of better energy relations between Russia and the EU. 
 
5  See Kirsten Westphal, “Gazprom und die EU-Regeln des Binnenmarktes – auch eine 
politische Frage”, Russland-Analysen, no. 305 (20 November 2015): 2–5. 
6  Jonas Grätz, “The Impact of EU Law on Gazprom and Its Implications, Presentation at 
Platts 7th European Gas Summit”, Vienna, 20 September 2013, http://www.platts.com/IM. 
Platts.Content/ProductsServices/ConferenceandEvents/2013/pc378/presentations/16.%20Dr.
%20Jonas%20Gratz_ETH%20ZURICH.pdf (accessed 1 May 2016). 
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Political Assessment 
The political evaluation is ambivalent to positive. If Gazprom’s export mo-
nopoly is abolished this could put the EU in a new situation, for example if 
several Russian gas suppliers were prepared to supply Nord Stream. That 
would establish competition over access to the Baltic pipelines and to their 
feeders. This would blunt the sword of EU regulation, above all for the 
politically-driven objective of limiting gas imports from Russia. If exports 
were gradually formally liberalised, the regulatory question of compatibil-
ity with the third internal energy market package would largely evaporate. 
If the political will existed, Russian-European cooperation in the gas sector 
could strike out in new directions and be placed on a broader footing. 
However this situation would also be a litmus test for the Commission and 
individual member states as it would mean clarifying whether the EU 
takes a generally critical line on imports from Russia, or only on deliveries 
from the monopolist Gazprom. This could further exacerbate the differ-
ences within the EU over how to deal with Russia. 
Politically there is a question concerning the “DNA” of the Russian com-
panies and the Kremlin’s orchestration of their activities. A problem could 
arise of Russian gas being formally marketed by several different compa-
nies that all in fact belong to Putin’s inner circle and have their contracts 
approved by the energy ministry. In that case it would be misleading to 
speak of “independent” companies. The Russian state holds more than 50 
percent of Gazprom’s shares and 69.5 percent of Rosneft’s. Novatek’s rapid 
conquest of market share in Russia from 2011/2012 would never have been 
possible without the Kremlin’s blessing. The LNG export liberalisation is 
also a case of orchestrated competition, with gas exporters required to 
inform the energy ministry of prices and terms. Here the Kremlin is clearly 
pursuing the objective of keeping export prices stable and avoiding price-
reducing competition among Russian exporters. 
It must therefore be assumed that the Kremlin will keep multiple op-
tions open, in a context where its decisions are shaped as much by geo-
political interests as by economic criteria. For that reason Germany and 
Europe need to implement the existing rules. But the regulatory frame-
work should not be altered for political reasons or selectively adjusted spe-
cifically for Russia’s engagement. Especially in Germany the gas market 
needs to be comprehensively monitored in order to keep a close eye on the 
strong position of Russian firms at all levels. It is also a strategic problem 
that the appetite of European firms to invest significantly in alternative 
gas imports and infrastructure is more likely to decrease in view of the 
market situation. 
All the possibilities to encourage economically rational actors and com-
panies in Russia through trade and shared business interests should be ex-
hausted, in order to promote reform from within in the Russian energy 
market. Opportunities are presented by the difficult situation in the econ-
omy and the energy sector. Far-reaching liberalisation would make it 
harder for the Kremlin to exert direct political influence on gas exports. 
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Confrontation in Russia’s Backyard: 
Intervention in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 
Sebastian Schiek 
Following the sudden death of the president in February 2025 Kazakh-
stan’s political elite splits into two camps. But the power struggle conducted 
behind closed doors is inconclusive, and international pressure ultimately 
forces the rivals to agree to a competitive presidential election. The winner 
of the ballot on 17 June 2025 is the charismatic Mukhtar Qunanbay, who 
conducted a nationalistic anti-Russian campaign. Moscow responds the 
very next day: armed “self-defence forces” appear in forty northern dis-
tricts where ethnic Russians are in the majority, supposedly for their pro-
tection. Russia officially declares itself the protector of Russians and 
Russian-speakers in Kazakhstan, and lands special forces at its air base at 
Kostanay in northern Kazakhstan. Army units move to the Russian-Kazakh 
border for a major manoeuvre, practising preventing terrorist groups 
entering Russia from Kazakhstan. At the same time Moscow threatens mili-
tary intervention to protect Russians abroad under Article 10 of the Law on 
Defence. The Kremlin justifies its actions as a response to persecution and 
killings of Russians in northern Kazakhstan, but without supplying verifi-
able evidence. In the two months before the election Russia had also issued 
passports, largely unnoticed, to tens of thousands of Russians in northern 
Kazakhstan; that now lends additional weight to its promises of protec-
tion. The intervention is accompanied by a massive propaganda campaign 
in Russian media against the election winner and his supporters. This 
stokes massive fears among the Russians in northern Kazakhstan, who lar-
gely consume Russian media. 
Although Qunanbay won the election, power has not yet formally been 
transferred. Until that happens, the old government legally remains in 
place. It is led by the former Chairman of the Senate, who was appointed 
interim president after the president’s death. Russia’s intervention changes 
the dynamic between the election winners and losers. While Qunanbay 
announces drastic action against Russia, the interim president sees per-
sonal advantage in the presence of the “self-defence forces” and leaves the 
Kazakh troops in their barracks. Qunanbay gains new supporters angered 
by the Russian intervention, initiates mass demonstrations and forces the 
old government to step down. 
The events also fire up an anti-regime movement in Tajikistan. Russia’s 
invasion of Kazakhstan supplies it with arguments against the Russian 
military base in Tajikistan and discredit the Tajik government and its co-
operation with Russia. The Tajik regime is presented as Moscow’s puppet 
and executor of a greater Russian project fighting Islam in Central Asia. 
Mobilisation is initially through social networks, largely reaching young 
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people. While the movement’s intellectual leaders are exile Tajiks, local 
leaders soon emerge and succeed in organising mass demonstrations 
against the local regime and Russia. The movement receives financial sup-
port from Islamic groups abroad. 
Facing massive pressure from the demonstrations, the Tajik regime 
draws security forces from across the country to the capital Dushanbe, 
leaving the rest of the country and its borders largely unprotected. Secu-
rity organs in the Rasht Valley and Gorno-Badakhshan secede from the cen-
tral government and operate as quasi-autonomous militias. Following the 
collapse of border controls almost all drug smuggling from Afghanistan 
now runs through Tajikistan. Cooperation with organised crime forms an 
important source of revenue for local leaders and renegade security organs, 
which consequently develop a consistent interest in chaos. In this predica-
ment the regime asks Russia for military assistance. Moscow, fearing a 
radical Islamist regime, acquiesces. With this move Russia also wants to 
win back China, which had initially backed Kazakhstan but regards a col-
lapse of the Tajik state as an incalculable risk for its own national security. 
Russia sends most of the 7,500 soldiers from the 201st Russian military 
base to support the local security organs in the Tajik capital. By securing 
government buildings, critical infrastructure and the border with Afghani-
stan, Russia hopes to free the regime’s own forces to concentrate on the 
rest of the country. Instead the government steadily loses control of the 
country and the flagrant involvement of Russian forces exacerbates the con-
flict. Russia’s involvement is formally covered by an inter-governmental 
agreement, but the regime’s opponents reject it as illegal. Russia now finds 
itself confronted with anti-Russian ideologies and movements in two states 
in its own “backyard”. 
Succession as Fracture Point 
The unclear succession in authoritarian Kazakhstan turns out to be the 
fracture point that unleashes the conflict dynamics after the elites un-
expectedly fail to agree on a new leader. In the power struggle between the 
two rival camps the challengers led by the charismatic Qunanbay win 
broad support with nationalist, anti-Russian, but also democratic slogans. 
They are able to persuade the West that they represent a real democratic 
alternative and receive strong symbolic support from the international 
community. The camp represented by the serving interim president finds 
itself forced to agree to competitive elections. 
These developments are driven by a growing popular mobilisation on a 
scale unprecedented in Kazakhstan, initiated by parts of the elites as a tac-
tic in the power struggle. The challengers profit from the country’s persis-
tently poor economic situation, reflected amongst other things in steadily 
falling household incomes in the middle class. The contradictions generated 
by integration with Russia are also glaring: it served the Kazakh leadership 
largely to defend its own power, while the population bore the brunt of 
the associated economic disadvantages. 
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In Tajikistan too, grievances foster the growth of the anti-regime move-
ment: the permanent worsening of the socio-economic situation, the expan-
sion of repressive measures against the population and ruthless repression 
of Islam. These factors created the basis for a broad and rapid mobilisation 
against the regime. 
Moreover, the Central Asian elites’ ties to foreign powers have shifted 
during the preceding years. The main reason for this is Russia’s economic 
crisis, which lessened its economic importance for Central Asia, while 
China expanded its economic engagement, above all in the energy and 
banking sectors. Elite groups working largely with Chinese partners now 
enjoy financial advantages over those more closely tied to Russia. While 
the latter seek to compensate through security cooperation with Russia, 
the Chinese-backed groups seek to loosen those ties. Russia’s relative loss of 
influence among the elites is mirrored in the populations. The popular 
trust Russia once enjoyed in Central Asia evaporates amidst its economic 
weakness and a virulent anti-Russian discourse. 
Russia’s Motives and Interests 
Although Russia is not economically dependent on Central Asia, the region 
remains important for symbolic, security and geopolitical reasons. Any 
conflict with Central Asian states would tend to run counter to Russian 
interests. But when the nationalist camp looks set to win in Kazakhstan 
the Kremlin fears losing not only its most important partner in Central 
Asia, but also the entire region in a domino effect. 
Exacerbating matters, Russia’s domestic situation has steadily worsened 
in recent years, with the economy failing to recover. To distract from those 
woes Moscow doubles down on its nationalist course. The Kremlin exploits 
Western support for the Kazakh challenger to nurture anti-Western senti-
ment in Russia. Allowing Kazakhstan to drift away would undermine Rus-
sia’s claim to be the dominant power in Central Asia. As such, a covert inter-
vention in parts of northern Kazakhstan ostensibly to protect ethnic Rus-
sians there presents it with an opportunity to consolidate support within 
Russia. Moscow also fosters groups campaigning massively against Kazakh-
stan and secures the support of the Russian Orthodox Church. The latter 
regards northern Kazakhstan as part of the “Russian world” (russkiy mir) and 
supports a Russian intervention “to protect Orthodox Christian Russians”. 
The protest movement in Tajikistan, inspired by the developments in 
Kazakhstan and the Kazakh-Russian conflict, greatly complicates the over-
all situation from Moscow’s perspective. The Kremlin’s uppermost concern 
is to prevent the toppling of another partner regime and avert the collapse 
of the central state, as that would have dramatic repercussions for the 
security of the entire region. 
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Implications for Germany and the EU 
A split in the elites and a power struggle openly conducted through elec-
tions in Kazakhstan would not automatically be harmful. Under certain 
conditions it could even lead to positive developments. 
Europe should closely analyse opposition demands, rather than making 
blithe assumptions about their nature and objectives. It must be asked 
whether the demands represent real and realistic goals, or just slogans 
designed to mobilise supporters at home and abroad. In numerous “colour 
revolutions” supposedly pro-democracy opposition forces initially enjoyed 
Western support but after gaining power were unable or unwilling to keep 
their promises. If opposition movements in Central Asia take anti-Russian 
stances, the far-reaching implications for the regional order must be taken 
into consideration. 
In the medium to long term Russia should be encouraged to make fuller 
use of its potential to make a constructive contribution to security and sta-
bility in Central Asia. It should be acknowledged that Russia can play a use-
ful role as a security actor. Corresponding fields of activity should be 
created or preserved. For example a joint dialogue between the Central 
Asian states, Russia, China and the EU would be conceivable, addressing 
security and stability along the new Silk Road and the transport corridors 
under construction between China and Europe. 
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“Republic of Ossetia-Alania”: North and South 
Ossetia Unify in the Russian Federation 
Franziska Smolnik 
Spring 2017 sees a flurry of meetings between officials from Moscow, 
Vladikavkaz (North Ossetia) and Tskhinval/i.1 As soon becomes apparent, 
this intense exchange concerns more than the “presidential election” in 
the de facto state of South Ossetia. Shortly after his re-election, “head of 
state” Leonid Tibilov officially requests his territory’s integration into the 
Russian Federation. Following formal accession, it merges with North Osse-
tia and becomes part of Russia as the “Republic of Ossetia-Alania”. Unifica-
tion is celebrated with a ceremony on 8 June 2017 – exactly ninety-seven 
years after the Soviet flag was raised in Tskhinval/i.2 The choice of venue, 
at the southern end of the Roki Tunnel connecting North and South 
Ossetia, is symbolic: it recalls the Ossetian uprising of 1920 against the 
Georgian Mensheviks, which began in Roki district and was supported by 
Ossetians in the North Caucasus.3 South Ossetia’s unification with Russia, 
demanded in vain in 1920, is now reality, the representatives from 
Moscow, Vladikavkaz and Tskhinval/i declare. 
Tbilisi Dials Back Pragmatism 
Georgia held parliamentary elections on 8 October 2016. In the run-up, the 
Republican Party left the governing coalition and ran independently in the 
ballot. As a consequence, its member Paata Zakareishvili resigned from his 
post of state minister for reconciliation and civic equality in mid-July.4 
Zakareishvili’s time in office constituted a break with earlier approaches 
towards Georgia’s two separatist regions. Having a background as a civil 
society activist with long involvement in peace-building initiatives, he had 
focused on gradually building confidence between Georgians, Abkhazians 
and Ossetians – including working with the population of Georgia “proper” 
 
 
1  In many cases the parties use different versions of place names. The neutral alternative 
“Tskhinval/i” covers both the Georgian and Russian spellings, the latter also being used in 
South Ossetia. The designations of political offices in South Ossetia are placed in inverted 
commas to reflect the territory’s contested status under international law. 
2  V. A. Sakharov, A. E. Areshev and E. G. Semerikova, Abkhaziya i Yuzhnaya Osetiya posle priz-
naniya. Istoricheskiy i sovremennoy kontekst [Abkhazia and South Ossetia after recognition: 
Historical and current context] (Moscow, 2010), 129. 
3  Arsène Saparov, From Conflict to Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union and the Making of 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh (London and New York, 2014), 66–74. 
4  “New Defense Minister, State Minister for Reconciliation Appointed”, Civil.ge, 1 August 2016. 
  
SWP Berlin 
Conceivable Surprises 
October 2016 
 
 
65
“Republic of Ossetia-Alania”: North and South Ossetia Unify in the Russian Federation
M
ap
 6
: G
eo
rg
ia
 i
n
 t
h
e 
re
gi
o
n
al
 e
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t 
 
Franziska Smolnik 
SWP Berlin 
Conceivable Surprises 
October 2016 
 
 
66 
 – and was supportive of the de facto states’ de-isolation.5 His policies had 
been paralleled by efforts towards normalising relations with Moscow. 
Regular talks between Georgian Special Representative Zurab Abashidze 
and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin represented the most 
important remaining channel of communications.6 With a newly consti-
tuted governing coalition and changes in the ministry of reconciliation 
and civic equality after the parliamentary elections in October, Tbilisi 
returns to a less flexible approach vis-à-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
largely considering relations with both through the Russian-Georgian 
prism. Against that background and continuing Russian policies of further 
entrenching its position in the de facto states, Georgia also steps up its 
monitoring along the “administrative boundary lines” (ABLs) and increases 
the presence of security forces at crucial infrastructure facilities, especially 
those close to the ABLs.7 
Competition for South Ossetian Loyalty 
South Ossetia is preoccupied with voting as well, with “presidential elec-
tions” due in spring 2017. The main rivals for the post of “head of state” 
are the “parliamentary speaker” Anatoli Bibilov and the serving “Presi-
dent” Leonid Tibilov. In early 2015 Tskhinval/i and Moscow concluded a 
Treaty on Alliance and Integration,8 under which Russia assumes respon-
sibility for the region’s customs, defence and internal security.9 With view 
to the upcoming elections, however, the “presidential” candidates seek to 
move relations with Russia to yet another level. Not least to demonstrate 
their loyalty to Moscow – and thus secure electoral support – both sides 
publish plans for a referendum to pave the way for accession to the Rus-
 
5  “Seven Steps Taken by Tbilisi with Regard to Conflict Regions: What Has Tbilisi Had to 
Offer to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Past Three Years?” JAMnews, 11 November 
2016, http://jam-news.net/Publication/Get/en-US/119 (accessed 30 June 2016); “Paata Zaka-
reishvili: Peace needs its ‘tanks’, and we use them appropriately”, Observer, 30 March 2016. 
6  Diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia were suspended in 2008, a conse-
quence of the 2008 August war between both countries.  
7  Here the governing coalition has responded to demands raised in July 2015 in an open 
letter published by Georgian NGOs including Transparency International Georgia, Open 
Society Georgia Foundation and the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International 
Studies. The letter was a response to the practice of “borderisation” of which Russia is 
accused, meaning the fortification and arbitrary expansion of the “border” around South 
Ossetia; see “NGOs Address the Government Regarding Russian Advances in Georgia”, 
Transparency International Georgia, 14 July 2015, http://transparency.ge/en/node/5389.  
8  Dogovor mezhdu Respublikoy Yushnaya Osetiya i Rossiyskoy Federatsiey o soyuznichestve i integra-
tsii [Treaty on Alliance and Integration], 18 March 2015, http://www.mfa-rso.su/node/1289 
(accessed 1 July 2016); see also Valeriy Dzutsev, “Russia to Strip Abkhazia and South Osse-
tia of Their Limited Sovereignty”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 18 March 2015. 
9  Russia and Abkhazia also concluded a similar agreement. Western observers report 
that – in contrast to Abkhazia – the South Ossetian negotiators unreservedly approved 
the agreement. There was lively debate in South Ossetia, too, though and the adoption of 
certain amendments was (initially) postponed. 
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sian Federation.10 At the beginning of 2014 Bibilov and his United Ossetia 
Party had already called on the government to allow the population to 
vote on unification with its northern neighbour, and the following June 
they won the “parliamentary” elections under the slogan “five steps to 
Russia”.11 In October 2015, half a year after the signing of the integration 
treaty, de facto President Tibilov also aired referendum plans. While the 
content and date of such a referendum initially remained vague, in the fol-
lowing months the presidential camp increasingly frequently discussed 
details. Moscow at first refrained from comment. As already in connection 
with Tskhinval/i’s earlier declarations of intent, it pointed to the de facto 
state’s sovereignty and called the referendum an internal matter for South 
Ossetia. But in April 2016 President Putin also chose to use the ambiguous 
formulation that “nothing can hold Russia back, except the interests of the 
South Ossetian people”.12 
The discussions about a referendum are just one aspect of an increasingly 
aggressive election campaign. As in the preceding “presidential” election 
in 2011/12, which was overshadowed by a political crisis, the domestic 
political situation threatens to escalate again in early 2017. Various groups 
with ties to Moscow compete for political and financial influence in the 
region.13 Feuding among the elites is accompanied by the spread of popu-
lar frustration over low wages, high living costs and rampant unemploy-
ment.14 The situation is precarious not least because of military reforms 
resulting from the Treaty on Alliance and Integration. In the course of the 
partial integration of South Ossetian troops into Russian structures and 
the associated downsizing of the South Ossetian army (whose numbers 
had already been halved in 2010) many soldiers lose what had been for 
local conditions relatively well-paid work.15 The combination of a frustrated 
 
10  “O vkhozhdenii Yuzhnoy Osetii v sostav Rossii. Kratkaya istoriya voprosa” [On South 
Ossetia’s entry into Russia: A brief overview of the question], IA Regnum, 14 April 2016 (via 
Integrum). 
11  Liz Fuller, “South Ossetian Opposition Calls for Referendum on Unification”, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (online), 8 January 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/south-
ossetia-unification/25224202.html (accessed 17 July 2016). 
12  “Otvety na voprosy zhurnalistov po itogam ‘Pryamoy linii’” [Answers to questions 
from journalists at the “direct line”], Kremlin.ru (online), 14 April 2016, http://kremlin.ru/ 
events/president/news/51718 (accessed 12 July 2016). 
13  On the situation in 2011 and 2012 see Alexander Skakov, “The Political Scene in South 
Ossetia: The 2011–2012 Presidential Elections and What Became of Them”, Central Asia and 
the Caucasus 13, no. 4 (2012): 71–83. 
14  Aleksandr Skakov, “Yuzhnaya Osetiya, 2014 god: navstrechu novym ispytaniyam” 
[South Ossetia, 2014: Facing new challenges], in Ezhegodnik IMI 2014: Aktualnye problemy 
sovremennoy mirovoy politiki [Current problems of contemporary world politics], ed. Moskov-
skiy Gosudarstvenny Institut Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy (Moscow State Institute for 
International Relations) (Moscow, 2014), 53–62. 
15  Liz Fuller, “South Ossetia’s Leaders at Odds over Military Accord with Russia”, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (online), 5 March 2016; Anton Mardasov, “Yuzhnaya Osetiya voy-
det v Rossiyu cherez Genshtab” [South Ossetia joins Russia via general staff], Svobodnaya 
Pressa, 22 February 2016. 
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electorate with the presence of large numbers of weapons is explosive.16 
The referendum, originally postponed until after the “presidential” elec-
tion, takes place in late spring 2017 after all. A majority of the South Osse-
tian electorate approves constitutional amendments authorising the “head 
of state” to ask the Kremlin to accept South Ossetia into the Russian Feder-
ation.17 
Russia’s Interests and Instruments in the Caucasus 
While the discourse surrounding the unification ceremony might suggest 
otherwise, Moscow’s decision to permit North and South Ossetia to unite 
within the Russian Federation is not driven by any wish to complete a his-
toric mission or right a historic wrong. Instead the Kremlin’s actions repre-
sent a situative response to a series of current challenges in the Caucasus. 
After a decline in recent years, the frequency of reports of incidents of 
Islamist violence rises again at the beginning of 2017. At the same time, 
and despite further financial assistance from Moscow, North Ossetia ex-
periences no socio-economic recovery under its new governor appointed in 
2016.18 Like in certain neighbouring republics, the official indicators 
remain bleak19 and the entire region is mired in economic difficulties. 
Moscow’s development programmes for the North Caucasus have little im-
pact.20 For the Russian leadership this is not merely a local problem, 
because it has long regarded majority Christian Orthodox North Ossetia as 
an “anchor of stability” in the volatile North Caucasus.21 What is more, 
 
16  Murat Gukemuchov, “Kak reshit problemu nezakonnogo oruzhiya?” [How can the 
problem of illegal weapons be solved?], Ekho Kavkaza (online), 2 June 2016, http://www. 
ekhokavkaza.com/a/27775437.html (accessed 1 July 2016). 
17  Darya Tsoy, “Yuzhnaya Osetiya prosit Rossiyu prinyat ee v kachestve novogo subekta 
RF” [South Ossetia requests acceptance as new subject in RF], Izvestiya, 20 April 2016. 
18  “Sotsialno-ekonomicheskaya i politicheskaya situatsiya v RSO-Alaniya” [Socio-eco-
nomic and political situation in RSO-Alania], Puls Osetii 6 (February 2016); Astemir 
Comaev, “‘Regiony-bankroty mogut stat realnostyu v RF” [Bankrupt regions could become 
reality in RF], Ekho Moskvy (online), 12 November 2015, http://echo.msk.ru/blog/ 
astemirtsomaevv/1657248-echo/ (accessed 29 April 2016); Valery Dzutsati, “Businessmen 
in North Ossetia Politically Resurgent as Moscow’s Ability to Finance Republics Wanes”, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor 13, no. 117 (29 June 2016). 
19  According to latest official data, for example, in 2013 North Ossetia came 74th in the 
list of Russian regions by GDP (per capita); Federalnaya sluzhba gosudarstvennoy statisti-
ki, Regiony Rossii: Sotsialno-ekonimicheskie pokazateli 2015 [Russia’s regions: Socio-economic 
indicators 2015] (Moscow, 2015), 30. 
20  On the (in)effectiveness of the programmes, see Vladimir Kolosov et al., Consequences of 
Economic and Social Transformation Policies in the North Caucasus (Moscow: Institute of Geogra-
phy RAS, March 2016). Kolosov and his co-authors also point out that the official indicators 
do not entirely reflect the actual socio-economic situation. 
21  North Ossetia itself is less affected by radicalisation of its Muslim population than 
many neighbouring republics, but is not entirely immune to such developments. There 
are also occasional reports of suspected Islamists heading for Syria being detained at the 
Verkhniy Lars–Kazbegi border post between North Ossetia and Georgia; “Seryozny pro-
gnoz: Shto zhdyot Kavkaz posle smerti glavy Severnoy Osetii” [Prognosis serious: What 
awaits the Caucasus after the death of North Ossetia’s governor], Iron Post, 20 February 
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Russian geopolitical discourse attributes the entire North Caucasus a key 
role in Russia’s territorial integrity.22 
Tackling the partly transnational challenges in the region jointly with 
Georgia (which itself borders six of the seven North Caucasian republics, 
not counting secessionist Abkhazia) is not an option; bilateral political 
relations remain largely frozen.23 Moscow fears that the political crisis in 
the context of the “presidential” elections in South Ossetia could flashover 
to North Ossetia and further destabilise the situation in the North Cauca-
sus as a whole. South Ossetia’s integration into the Russian Federation is 
thus not least designed to calm the situation and block possible secession-
ist stirrings in Russia’s North Caucasian republics. At the same time the 
Kremlin hopes that unification will spur economic development; South 
Ossetia is confronted with depopulation tendencies and generally regarded 
as absolutely reliant on massive and continuous external economic and 
financial support.24 Moscow therefore regards the merger with North Osse-
tia as a “win-win” situation. 
Russia has certainly exploited its dominance in Georgia’s secessionist 
territories to pressure consistently pro-Western governments in Tbilisi. Its 
initially informal support of the secessionist entities and later close 
bilateral cooperation with the de facto states after recognition in 2008 has 
been Moscow’s most important instrument there.25 But Moscow also 
regards South Ossetia – like Abkhazia – as important for its own policies in 
the North Caucasus. South Ossetia’s integration is not long-planned and is 
as such not part of some revanchist masterplan.26 This interpretation is 
also supported by the limited public enthusiasm for the project in the rest 
 
2016; Tornike Sharashenidze and Ivan Sukhov, “Severny Kavkaz v kontekste rossiysko-
gruzinskikh otnosheniy” [The North Caucasus in the context of Russian-Georgian rela-
tions], in Rossiya i Gruziya: v poiskakh vykhoda [Russia and Georgia looking for a way out], ed. 
Kakha Gogolashvili (Moscow and Tbilisi, 2011), 25–53. 
22  V. A. Kolosov and A. B. Sebentsev, “Severny Kavkaz v Rossiyskom geopoliticheskom 
diskurse” [The North Caucasus in Russian geopolitical discourse], Polis: Politicheskie issledo-
vaniya, no. 2 (2014): 146–63. 
23  International Crisis Group, The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad? 
Europe Report 238/2016 (Brussels, March 2016); Giorgi Goguadze and Sergi Kapanadze, 
Daesh and Challenges Facing Georgia (Tbilisi: Georgia’s Reforms Associates [GRASS], November 
2015). 
24  Tracey German, “Russia and South Ossetia: Conferring Statehood or Creeping Annexa-
tion?”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, no. 1 (2016): 155–67. 
25  Andrey Makarychev, The Limits of Russian Soft Power in Georgia, PONARS Eurasia Policy 
Memo 412 (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, January 2016). 
26  Sabine Fischer, “Russian Policy in the Unresolved Conflicts”, in idem., ed., Not Frozen! 
The Unresolved Conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Light of 
the Crisis over Ukraine, SWP Research Paper 9/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Poli-
tik, September 2016): 9–24. At the same time implementation of the Treaty on Alliance 
and Integration between Moscow and Tskhinval/i also makes incorporation easier. As well 
as the aforementioned areas of customs, defence and internal security, this also applies 
for example to the gradual harmonisation of South Ossetian pensions and “public” em-
ployees’ pay with their equivalents in the North Caucasus Federal District (article 7 and 
8). Certain restriction normally applied by Russia to holders of dual citizenship also cease 
to apply to persons holding both Russian and South Ossetian “citizenship”. 
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of Russia,27 and also in North Ossetia, where despite the unification rheto-
ric of the political elites the public is by no means unreservedly positive 
towards their South Ossetian compatriots.28 
Recommendations 
Until March 2014 most analyses regarded South Ossetia’s integration into 
the Russian Federation as extremely unlikely. The predominant reasoning 
was that the international community would regard such a move as a 
blatant Russian annexation. But the argument that Moscow would want to 
avoid creating a precedent evaporated with the annexation of Crimea. The 
case of Crimea also demonstrated the very limited influence open to Ger-
many and the EU in such a scenario. It is therefore all the more important 
to take preventive action.29 Germany and the EU should engage continu-
ously for the regulation of the unresolved conflicts in Georgia, specifically 
also in phases where the extent of manifest physical violence is small or 
even absent. Further, in view of the highly politicised context, prudent 
expectation management is advised. A “policy of small steps” is the most 
realistic option. In particular support should be given to measures that 
aim to improve the humanitarian and socio-economic situation, secure 
progress on freedom of movement for the local populations (Georgians 
and Ossetians) and generally counteract the international isolation of the 
de facto state South Ossetia. The Micro-economic Initiative Programme of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which supplied 
know-how and funding to businesses from 2009 to 2013, represents one 
 
27  In 2014 a survey by the Levada Centre found 24 percent support for South Ossetia 
joining the Russian Federation and 51 percent for South Ossetia remaining an independ-
ent state; “Rossiyane o statuse Abkhazii i Yuzhnoy Osetii” [Russians on the status of Ab-
khazia and South Ossetia], Levada (online), 21 August 2015, http://www.levada.ru/2014/08/ 
21/rossiyane-o-statuse-abhazii-i-yuzhnoj-osetii/. A survey by another Russian sociological 
and market research institute, VCIOM, in 2013, found 23 percent rejecting Russian assis-
tance for South Ossetia, four years earlier, in 2009, the figure was just 6 percent; “Press-
vypusk No. 2367” [Press release no. 2367], VCIOM (online), 8 August 2013, http://wciom.ru/ 
index.php?id=236&uid=114342 (both accessed 20 May 2016). 
28  Ossetians in the North and South Caucasus are not a homogeneous group, but com-
prise various ethnic and linguistic sub-groups. Additionally, it is said that after belonging 
to Georgia for decades the South Ossetians are culturally very different in certain re-
spects. On negative stereotypes against South Ossetians in North Ossetia see A. U. 
Kachmazova, “Etnicheskie avtostereotypy yuzhnykh osetin v aspekte mezhkulturnoy 
kommunikatsii” [Ethnic self-images of South Ossetians in the context of intercultural 
communication], Aktualnye problemy gumanitarnykh i estestvennykh nauk 9 (September 2012); 
on the heterogeneity of the Ossetians, see Victor Shnirelman, “The Politics of a Name: 
Between Consolidation and Separation in the Northern Caucasus”, Acto Slavonica Japonica 
23 (2006), 37–73 (here: 37–49; 71–72). 
29  For a comparative study of the unresolved conflicts in the post-Soviet space and a dis-
cussion of the options for Germany and the EU, see Sabine Fischer, “Conclusions and 
Recommendations: European Peace Policy in the Unresolved Conflicts”, in idem, ed., Not 
Frozen! (see note 26): 81–93. 
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example of the former.30 Berlin and Brussels should also work for the con-
tinuation of the Geneva International Discussions, which also play an 
important role in stabilising the situation. This format would also offer 
scope to think about projects that could benefit residents of the Russian 
North Caucasus, South Ossetia and Georgia alike.31 It is important that the 
programmes be carefully designed and contribute to confidence-building. 
In the past socio-economic assistance for South Ossetia has worsened rival-
ry between Moscow and Tbilisi in the region.32 As far as funding for recon-
struction and social and economic development are concerned, Russia’s 
dominance has grown even greater since its recognition of South Ossetia 
in 2008. The resulting asymmetry needs to be reflected in project develop-
ment, as does (elite) corruption, which also impairs the efficiency of meas-
ures funded by Russia. All German and European engagement should be 
based on three assumptions: 1. The Georgian government should be en-
couraged to adhere to a constructive and active conflict policy. 2. Dialogue 
with Russia should continue where possible. 3. The actions of Western 
actors in particular should be more strongly guided by a recognition that 
many of the problems that plague the North and South Caucasus are trans-
national in nature. 
 
 
 
30  The ICRC maintains a presence in South Ossetia and participates in other projects in 
the region involving Georgians and Russians as well as South Ossetians. Since 2010 its 
coordination mechanism to determine the fate of persons missing since the August 2008 
war regularly brings together representatives of South Ossetia, Georgia and Russia. 
31  There would certainly be potential for cooperation between Tbilisi and Moscow to 
counteract Islamist radicalisation in the Caucasus. But in the past each side has tended to 
blame the other for the problem of growing Islamist extremism. Analyses and consulta-
tion papers prepared jointly by Russian and Georgian experts (cf. note 21) could contrib-
ute to challenging such one-sided perspectives. 
32  Giorgi Gogia, “Georgia-South Ossetia: A Prelude to War: Did Economic Assistance 
Strengthen Competing Spoilers in Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict?”, Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, no. 6 (2009): 32–41. 
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Russia after the Duma Elections: Reformist 
Government and Nationalist Foreign Policy 
Sabine Fischer and Margarete Klein 
As expected Vladimir Putin’s United Russia wins an absolute majority in 
the September 2016 Duma elections. Like the three previous legislatures, 
the sixth State Duma contains only system-compliant opposition parties. 
The non-systemic liberal opposition remains marginalised. 
In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in December 2016 Presi-
dent Vladimir Putin finally announces the government reshuffle, about 
which there had been repeated speculation since the end of 2015. He 
appoints Alexei Kudrin, the head of the Civil Initiatives Committee (CIC),1 
prime minister. Kudrin served as finance minister from 2000 to 2011, 
when he was regarded as a leading representative of the reformist techno-
crats within the Russian leadership. His macroeconomic stability policy 
helped to lessen the impact of the international financial crisis of 2008/ 
2009 on the Russian economy. Putin and Kudrin have known each other 
since the 1990s, when they both worked for the St Petersburg city adminis-
tration. Kudrin is regarded as a confidant of Putin and rival of his predeces-
sor, Dmitri Medvedev. The CIC, which Kudrin founded in 2012, has repeat-
edly spoken out critically against the government. In spring 2016 Putin 
appointed Kudrin deputy chair of the president’s Economic Council and 
put him in charge of the Centre for Strategic Development. Now Kudrin 
moves, with effect from January 2017, from these purely advisory func-
tions to become head of the executive. 
Alexei Kudrin’s appointment comes in a context of enduring economic 
crisis, driven by structural weaknesses of the Russian economy, low 
resource prices and Western sanctions. After the crisis over Ukraine broke 
out in early 2014 the political leadership placed its faith in conservative/ 
nationalist concepts such as import substitution and innovation through 
strengthening the defence industries. Kudrin’s appointment appears to be 
an implicit admission that this approach has failed. The new prime minis-
ter immediately begins filling key economic and financial posts with sup-
porters of moderate reforms. 
The months after the election see a new tone in domestic and economic 
policy, announcing deep reforms including economic liberalisation, pri-
vatisation and diversification. Concepts such as rule of law and civil society 
resurface in official discourse. The technocrats send cautious signals 
hinting at opening to the EU and its member states. The responsible Rus-
sian ministries propose to the EU delegation in Moscow that the economic 
and trade dialogues and working groups that had been suspended in 2014 
 
1  Komitet grazhdanskikh initsiativ [Civil Initiatives Committee], http://www.komitetgi.ru 
(accessed 1 May 2016). 
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in response to the annexation of Crimea could be revived. Individual gov-
ernment representatives suggest in the media that a unilateral relaxation 
of Russian sanctions against the EU would be possible. With these moves 
Kudrin and his entourage distance themselves from the anti-Western 
nationalist discourse that had defined Russian domestic and foreign policy 
since 2014. 
At the same time, however, Russian foreign policy hardens further from 
early 2017. Conservative and nationalist actors step up their rhetoric 
towards Russia’s neighbourhood and tensions rise with individual post-
Soviet states, especially Ukraine and Georgia.2 The Kremlin also intensifies 
the military counter-measures initiated in response to the Warsaw NATO 
Summit of July 2016. Here Moscow is also responding to the stance of the 
new US President Hillary Clinton, who is more critical of Russia than her 
predecessor. In February 2017 Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu reiterates 
Russia’s demand for NATO to cancel phase three of its missile defence sys-
tem. For the first time, Shoygu threatens that Moscow will otherwise with-
draw from the INF Treaty by 2018.3 Russia steps up its disinformation cam-
paigns in France and Germany ahead of the French presidential election in 
April 2017 and the German Bundestag election in September 2017, in order 
to influence internal developments in these two major EU member states.4 
After five years of Russian foreign policy with a clearly nationalist and 
anti-Western slant, Germany and the EU suddenly find themselves con-
fronted with contradictory signals from Moscow. On the one hand, part of 
the Russian government apparently wants to reduce tensions and explore 
possibilities of cooperation in the area of economic reforms. On the other 
hand, Russian foreign and security policy clings to its hegemonic stance in 
the post-Soviet space and its confrontational course towards the West. 
Interpretations 
The constitution of the Russian Federation places foreign policy exclusively 
in the hands of the president. The prime minister occupies a very weak 
position in the Russian hyperpresidential system, with his or her powers 
restricted to domestic and economic matters. Under the constitution it is 
the president – not the prime minister – who appoints the heads of the so-
called power ministries (foreign, defence, internal affairs) and the security 
services. They remain unchanged in the new government. As a result, 
Kudrin’s technocrats lack decisive leverage within the institutional frame-
work of the foreign policy decision-making process. 
In recent years Russian domestic and foreign policy have become in-
creasingly entangled. It can therefore be assumed that the ambivalent mes-
sages reaching Germany and the EU after the reshuffle are also related to 
domestic politics. Two interpretations are possible: 
 
2  See the contribution by Franziska Smolnik in this volume (64ff.). 
3  See the contribution by Oliver Meier in this volume (47ff.). 
4  See the contributions in this volume by Liana Fix and Ronja Kempin (13ff.) and Susan 
Stewart (18ff.). 
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Continuation of strategic ambivalence. Under this interpretation there is 
an elite consensus between the so-called siloviki – politically influential 
figures with a background in the security organs – and the reformist tech-
nocrats: Moscow has to break through its isolation from the West in order 
to tackle the economic crisis and secure the legitimacy and stability of the 
political system – without abandoning existing geopolitical positions. This 
produces a kind of division of labour where the technocratic section of 
government is in charge of fostering economic cooperation with the West, 
while the power ministries adhere to their hard foreign policy and security 
positions. There is little friction between two sides, as the appointment of 
a “reformist” government is merely a means to soften the West’s unity over 
sanctions. 
One factor supporting this interpretation is that many technocrats the 
West perceives as liberal also share a conviction that Russia must remain a 
hegemonic power in the post-Soviet space and a major power on the inter-
national stage. These actors differ from the siloviki only in their choice of 
means. While the siloviki rely on hard power politics, the technocrats pri-
oritise economic development and competitiveness. Whenever conflicts 
have occurred, for example the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 or the annexa-
tion of Crimea in 2014, the technocrats have toed the Kremlin’s line. 
Kudrin is no exception. Generally in the past fifteen years they have been 
more interested in their own political survival than in the presentation of 
political alternatives. The comprehensive marginalisation and suppression 
of the non-systemic liberal opposition after 2011/12 – including political 
assassinations – drastically curtailed the incentives to deviate from that 
course. Therefore, the technocrats are not avoiding confrontation with the 
siloviki; confrontation is not what they are aiming for at all. 
 
Elite conflict. In this second interpretation the technocrats do actually 
represent a fundamentally different foreign policy than the siloviki. In 
view of the collapse of international resource prices and the state’s dwin-
dling foreign currency reserves, they are convinced that Russia will require 
substantial cooperation with the West if it is to overcome its structural 
economic deficits and crisis. Although the technocrats still see Russia as a 
major power and hegemon in Eurasia, they want a deep internal restruc-
turing and an opening to the West. They therefore regard it as a grave 
error to risk further disruption in relations with the EU and the United 
States. But the siloviki insist on their hard anti-Western positions. They 
also feel threatened by the political revival of the reformists. Their nation-
alist propaganda mobilises the support of the conservative majority of the 
population. The technocrats in turn attempt to strengthen their own – 
hitherto weak – position in the foreign policy process through contact 
with Western actors. 
Supporting this interpretation, Russia’s persistent economic crisis puts 
the technocrats’ core issues at the top of the agenda. The political system is 
coming under increasing pressure as declining economic performance 
erodes its output legitimacy. In this situation the technocrats could decide 
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to drop their conformist stance. Additionally, a year before the March 2018 
presidential elections the domestic political environment will become 
more fluid, which could increase the incentives for clear positioning. 
 
It would also be conceivable, combining the two interpretations, for a 
division of labour between the two groups to lead to an elite conflict, 
because the interests of the two sides are not compatible in the longer run. 
Implications and Policy Options for Germany and the EU 
Germany and the EU have a strong interest inreturning to an open dia-
logue with the Russian leadership, addressing possibilities for cooperation 
in foreign and security policy as well as political and economic reforms. 
But Russia’s authoritarian governance and the crisis in relations since 
2014 have severely damaged trust in the Kremlin in Berlin and Brussels. 
If the first interpretation turns out to be correct – Moscow is merely 
playing a game with shared roles – Germany and the EU find themselves 
on the receiving end of a deliberate instrumentalisation of strategic am-
bivalence. The earnestness of Russian reform rhetoric can be tested 
through specific offers of cooperation in economic and social spheres. But 
the fundamental European stance on sanctions and other controversial 
issues must not be watered down. 
If the second interpretation is correct – an elite conflict is behind con-
flicting messages from Moscow – Germany and the EU have limited in-
fluence. There would also be a risk of unwittingly undermining the re-
formist technocrats or inflaming conflicts. For example, a Western policy 
clearly backing the reformers could allow their opponents to discredit 
them as “traitors”. On the other hand the absence of any sign of willing-
ness to cooperate risks further weakening the reformers. 
The central challenge for Berlin and Brussels is to find out which of the 
two interpretations is correct. The lack of transparency in the Russian 
political system means that information about internal processes is 
extremely scarce. Germany and the EU should therefore proceed with 
great caution and watch very closely for power shifts or conflicts within 
the Russian elites. One possible sign of this would be an increasing instru-
mentalisation of legal organs, for example through arbitrary arrests and 
investigations or politically motivated prosecutions. The same applies to 
arguments over the state budget and conflicts between companies tied to 
particular elite groups. 
Either way the situation faces Germany and the EU with a dilemma. If 
they respond too harshly they risk undermining the actors of a possible 
opening and thus subverting the opening itself. But if they allow them-
selves to be divided by Moscow’s ambivalent signals they lose their internal 
cohesion and the basis for a resolute stance towards Russia. 
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Appendix 
Abbreviations 
AfD Alternative for Germany 
CIC Civil Initiatives Committee (Komitet grazhdanskikh initsiativ,) 
CRRC Caucasus Research Resource Center 
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
DGAP Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (Berlin) 
EEAS European External Action Service 
FN Front National (France) 
GAC Governmental Advisory Council (of ICANN) 
GD Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
INF Intermediate range nuclear forces 
IS “Islamic State” 
ISAC International and Security Affairs Centre (Belgrade) 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
LNG Liquefied natural gas 
LR Les Républicains (France) 
LSRO Long-Range standoff weapon 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NDI National Democratic Institute (Georgia) 
NSPM Nova Srspska Politička Misao (New Serbian Political Thought) 
PONARS Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, D.C.) 
PS Parti Socialiste (France) 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
UNM United National Movement (Georgia) 
VCIOM Vserossiyskiy tsentr izucheniya obshchestvennogo mneniya  
(Russian Public Opinion Research Centre) 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
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